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The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees 
Governmental activities affect each of us in a myriad of ways. 
The government's role as employer may pale in comparison with the 
more glamorous activities of the government as national defender, 
law enforcer, and allocator of scarce resources. Yet the legal ramifi-
cations of public employment-where the public interest in efficient 
governmental operation often conflicts with the public employee's 
freedom-have a profound influence upon American society.1 
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education2 
formulated a test designed to balance these interests in defining the 
scope of a public employee's freedom of expression.3 In examining 
the nonpartisan free speech rights of civilian governmental workers, 4 
1. In 1975 there were approximately 2.9 million civilian employees of the federal 
government, as well as 12.1 million civilian state and local employees. U.S. BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF 1HE UNITED STATES: 1976, at xvi. 
When compared with the 1915 employed civilian work force of 84.8 million, id. at 
xviii, it becomes apparent that about 18% of American workers are employed in the 
public sector. Thus, as was pointed out by Professor Emerson, T. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 563 (1971), any restrictions placed upon the 
free speech rights of such a large -proportion of our work force should be a matter 
of grave concern. 
2. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
3. Critics are dissatisfied both with Pickering's use of a balancing approach and 
with the Court's express refusal to articulate a specific standard for striking the bal-
ance required in the announced test. See the discussion of the Pickering test in note 
25 infra. 
4. "Nonpartisan speech," as used in this Note, includes all expression by public 
employees that does not invoke the prohibition against political expression and ac-
tivities found in the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1976), and its equivalents 
at the state and local levels. 
This distinction is not always easy to draw. For example, in Alderman v. Phila-
delphia Hous. Auth., 496 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), the 
defendant housing authority had circulated a memorandum prohibiting its employees 
from talking with tenants about a referendum dealing with tenant representation on 
the housing authority. Plaintiffs were summarily discharged from defendant's em-
ployment for refusing to sign the memorandum. The Third Circuit recognized that 
the defendant might have a legitimate interest in preventing political or partisan in-
terference with the referendum, but it concluded that the memorandum unjustifiably 
restricted all speech on the subject and thus constituted an unconstitutional prior re-
straint upon the freedom of expression of the employees. 496 F.2d at 169-73. The 
court distinguished the Supreme Court decisions in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601 (1973), and United States Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. of Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), which upheld the validity of the prohibition against politi-
cal activity by public employees found in the Hatch Act and its Oklahoma equivalent, 
by stating that those cases, "properly viewed, carve out carefully circumscribed excep-
tions to the sweeping injunction of the First Amendment, exceptions allowing a legis-
lature-Congress or state lawmakers-to inhibit only 'partisan political activity' and 
not all political 'discussion."' 496 F.2d at 172 (emphasis original). For a per-
suasive argument that the Alderman decision should have been based upon an oyer-
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this Note analyzes Pickering and the cases following it, focusing on 
the proper application of that case's balancing test and on the roles 
fashioned for public employees by these cases. 5 
I. Pickering v. Board of Education 
Until recently, the courts viewed public employment as a privi-
lege bestowed upon governmental workers conditioned upon their 
waiver of those constitutional rights deemed in conflict with public 
service. Since prospective public employees could avoid these re-
strictions by obtaining employment in the private sector, acceptance 
of the privilege of public employment was viewed as voluntary ac-
quiescence in the incidental limitations on their constitutional rights. 0 
breadth analysis rather than the court's prior restraint analysis, see 48 TEMP, L.Q. 
192 (1974). 
Several cases decided prior to Letter Carriers and Broadrick drew a distinction 
between partisan and nonpartisan political activity similar to that developed in Alder-
man. See Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574, 582-83 (D.R.I. 1972), affd., 416 F.2d 
187 (1st Cir. 1973); Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-89 (N.D. Ohio 
1971). A recent decision by the First Circuit sought to clarify the distinction be-
tween partisan and nonpartisan political activity. In Magill v. Lynch, 400 F. Supp. 
84, 90-92 (D.R.!. 1975), revd., 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 
U.S.L.W. 3519 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978), the district court had held that a Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island, city charter provision prohibiting city employees from taking part 
in political campaigns or running for any political office, whether partisan or non-
partisan, was unconstitutional. On appeal, the First Circuit, in an opinion by Chief 
Judge Coffin, held that the prohibition against public employees running for 
nonpartisan municipal office was constitutional under Letter Carriers and Broad-
rick because the political environment in Pawtucket had infused partisanship into 
the facially nonpartisan local election process, 560 F.2d at 28, and because the city 
"could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his 
superior or running for a position that confers great power over his superior." 560 
F.2d at 29. The First Circuit did remand the case to the district court for considera-
tion of whether the city charter provision was unconstitutionally overbroad in prohib-
iting municipal employees from taking part in a "political campaign," 560 F.2d at 
29 n.6, or from running for "any public office, whether city, state or federal," 560 
F.2d at 29. With respect to the restriction on "political'' campaigning, the court indi-
cated that, if the term "political" were construed to mean only "1)artisan," no over-
breadth problem would exist. 560 F.2d at 29 n.6. 
For a general discussion of the restriction on the partisan political expression and 
activities of public employees, see Martin, The Constitutionality of the Hatch Act: 
Second Class Citizens/zip for Public Employees, 6 U. ToL. L. REV, 78 (1974); Minge, 
Federal Restrictions on the Political Activities of State and Local Employees, 51 
MINN. L. REv. 493 (1973); Vaughn, Restrictions on the Political Activities of Public 
Employees: The Hatch Act and Beyond, 44 GEO. WASH, L. REY. 516 (1976). 
5. For an examination of the concept of free speech as applied to military person-
nel, one category of public employment not examined by this Note, see Carlson v. 
Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 413 
F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1976); Imwinkelreid & Zillman, An Evolution in the First 
Amendment: Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech Within the Military Commu-
nity, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 42 (1975). 
6. The classic statement of this right-privilege distinction is found in McAuliffe 
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), where Justice 
Holmes, then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, rejected the 
constitutional argument made by a policeman who had been fired for engaging in 
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Even before Pickering, however, the harshness of the right-privilege 
distinction came into disfavor with the courts. 7 
In Pickering8 the Supreme Court removed any doubt about the 
demise of the right-privilege distinction as a justification for limiting 
the freedom of expression of public employees. In the process of 
invalidating the dismissal of a teacher who had been fired for writing 
a letter critical of the school board to a local newspaper, 9 the Court 
political activities. Justice Holmes stated that 
[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in 
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free 
speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant 
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered 
him. 
155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. 
7. To ameliorate some of the harshness resulting from the strict right-privilege 
distinction, courts began to adopt the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The 
essential element of this doctrine is the notion that "whatever an express constitu-
tional provision forbids the government to do directly it equally forbids the govern-
ment to do indirectly." Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction 
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1445-46 (1968). Thus, although the 
government is not required to provide its citizens with a certain privilege such as pub-
lic employment, it may not condition the grant of the privilege upon the surrender 
of an explicit constitutional right, such as freedom of speech. Id. See Frost & Frost 
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commn., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926). An example of the 
increased acceptance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was provided by 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), in which the Supreme Court 
quoted with approval language from the lower court opinion: "'the theory that pub-
lic employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, 
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.'" 385 U.S. at 605-06 
(quoting 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965) ). 
Much legal scholarship has been devoted to the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions and the corresponding reduction in the right-privilege distinction. For a rela-
tively modern look at these concepts, see Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of 
Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 
16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 751 (1969); Van Alstyne, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, supra; Com-
ment, Another Look at. Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968). 
An overview of the historical development of these concepts as they relate to public 
employment is presented in Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees: 
Times Marches On, 51 GEO. L.J. 134, 134-42 (1968), and Note, The First Amend-
ment and Public Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right To Be a Police-
man?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 409, 409-12 (1968). 
8. Thpre is considerable literature on Pickering. See, e.g., Note, Teachers' Free-
dom of Expression Outside the Classroom: An Analysis of the Application of Picker-
ing and Tinker, 8 GA. L. REV. 900 (1974); Note, 57 GEO. L.J. 134, supra note 7; 
Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 
IOWA L. REV. 1256 (•1974); Note, First Amendment Rights and Teachers Dismissal: 
A Survey, 4 Omo N.U.L. REV. 392 (1977). 
9. The letter criticized the board of education's handling of certain bond issue 
proposals and the board's later allocation of financial resources between the educa-
tional and athletic programs of the school. In a subsequent termination hearing held 
pursuant to Illinois law, the board charged that publication of the letter unjustifiably 
impugned the integrity of the board and school administration and that false state-
ments in the letter had a disruptive effect upon the school. No evidence was intro-
duced regar_ding the effect of the publication of the letter on either the community 
as a whole or on the school system in particular, and the board made no specific 
findings regarding these matters. The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected Pickering's 
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rejected the suggestion that "teachers may constitutionally be com-
pelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would other-
wise enjoy as citizens"10 as a condition of employment. The Court, 
nonetheless, recognized that the government, as an employer, may 
have greater interests in regulating the speech of its employees than 
in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general. To determine 
when these interests are sufficient to restrict employee speech, the 
Court adopted an ad hoc balancing test to weigh the interest of the 
employee as a citizen to comment upon matters of public interest 
against the interest of the state as an employer to maintain the effi-
ciency of public service performed through its employees.11 
Although the Court refused to announce a general standard for 
determining when the expression of the employee would be pro-
tected, 12 it did indicate some of the factors that might be considered 
in balancing the competing interests. Relevant variables that weigh 
in favor of the state include its interest in removing incompetent em-
ployees, 13 in maintaining discipline by immediate superiors, in pre-
serving harmony among co-workers, 14 in maintaining personal loyalty 
and confidence when necessary to a particular working relationship 
or employment position, 15 in avoiding the general impairment of 
governmental operations, 16 and in rebutting without undue difficulty 
the false statements of its employees.17 Factors that reflect the em-
ployee's and the public's interest in free expression and that thus 
counter the government's interest in restricting an employee's speech 
include the relationship of the expression to an issue of public con-
cern, the degree to which the speech is made in a public context, 
claim that his letter was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Pickering 
v. Board of Educ., 36 Ill. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967). The United States Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that under the applicable balancing test, see text at notes 11-
25 infra, Pickering's freedom of speech had been violated. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
10. 391 U.S. at 568. 
11. 391 U.S. at 568-. 
12. 391 U.S. at 569. The Court believed that no general standard could be de-
veloped because of the enormous variety of factual situations in which critical state-
ments by public employees might be deemed by their superiors to justify dismissal. 
391 U.S. at 569. 
13. See 391 U.S. at 573 n.5. 
14. 391 U.S. at 570. 
15. 391 U.S. at 570 n.3. The Court there stated that 
[i]t is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the 
need for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public state-
ments might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal. Likewise, positions in 
public employment in which the relationship between superior and subordinate 
is of such a personal and intiniate nature that certain forms of public criticism of 
the superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of 
the working relationship between them can also be imagined. 
16. See 391 U.S. at 568. 
17. 391 U.S. at 572. 
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and the likelihood that the employee would have an informed and 
definite opinion on -the subject of the speech.18 On the facts in 
Pickering, the Court found that the interest of the school authorities 
in limiting Pickering's speech was not significantly greater than its 
interest in limiting similar expression by a member of the general 
public, 19 and thus it determined that the speech did not justify his 
dismissal. 
The inquiry does not necessarily end when the balance is found 
to favor the employee. Drawing a loose analogy between the award 
of libel damages and the termination of public employment, 20 the 
Court in Pickering suggested that, even where the employee is 
treated as a general citizen, proof of false statements critical of the 
public employer that were knowingly or recklessly made might pro-
vide an adequate basis for dismissal. 21 Absent any false statements 
that meet this standard, the outcome of the balancing test determines 
whether termination of public employment because of an employee's 
speech is constitutionally permissible or whether, instead, the speech 
is constitutionally protected.22 Because a reading of the cases fol-
lowing Pickering indicates that the· knowing and reckless falsehood 
standard has received little judicial attention in the context of public 
employment, this Note will focus primarily on the balancing test an-
nounced in Pickering. 
In its treatment of the facts, the Court in_Pickering indicated that, 
once a discharged public employee has met the initial burden of 
establishing that he was fired because of his expression, the balanc-
ing test shifts the burden of proof to the state to show that the speech 
18. 391 U.S. at 569-73. 
19. 391 U.S. at 573. 
20. The Court did note its "disinclination to make an across-the-board equa-
tion of dismissal from public employment for remarks critical of superiors with 
awarding damages in a libel suit by a public official for similar criticism." 391 U.S. 
at 574. Justice White, however, appeared to be willing to make the equation. Re-
lying on Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964), for the proposition that false 
statements knowingly or recklessly made do not enjoy constitutional protection, Jus-
tice White concluded that a public employee enjoys no constitutional protection from 
dismissal for such statements. 391 U.S. at 583-84 (concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
21. 391 U.S. at 574. See Note, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1256, supra note 8, at 1263. 
The Court appeared to establish the reckless and knowing falsehood standard of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (-1964), as the minimum standard for dis-
missal. Over the objection of Justice White, 391 U.S. at 584 (concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), the Court did not rule out the possibility that "a statement 
that was knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were neither shown nor could rea-
sonably be presumed to have had any harmful effects, still be protected by the First 
Amendment." 391 U.S. at 574 n.6. 
22. The logic of Pickering seems to dictate that the knowing and reckless false- · 
hood standard apply only after the balancing test has been resolved in favor of 
the employee. See Note, 59 IOWA L. RE.v. 1256, supra note 8, at 1264. 
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had impeded the employee's performance or otherwise interfered 
with efficient operation of the government. 23 Where the state has 
shown impairment of the governmental interest, the extent of that 
impairment is to be balanced against the employee's interest in mak-
ing and the public's interest in hearing the expression. By limiting 
itself to a very general discussion of the balancing test, the Court 
in Pickering left for future clarification two issues important to the 
application of the test. First, because Pickering's dismissal was 
based solely on the publication of his letter, the Court did not specify 
the degree of causation between the speech and the dismissal that 
the employee must establish to initiate the balancing test. Until it 
was recently settled by the Supreme Court, 24 this question produced 
disagreement among the lower courts. More important, because the 
Court assigned no weights to the variables considered in balancing 
the state's interest against that of the employee, lower courts in sub-
sequent cases have been forced to develop the contours of the bal-
ancing test. 211 
23. This showing would involve proof of interference with one or more govern-
mental interests, such as those discussed in the text at notes 13-17 supra. 
24. See text at notes 42-64 infra. 
25. The ambiguity of the Pickering test is troublesome because it forces public 
employees and their supervisors to guess how courts will balance in any given case, 
with a likely chilling effect upon the exercise of the freedom of expression by these 
employees. In constructing the Pickering balancing test, the Court presumed that the 
letter had caused no actual disruption of the regular operation of the school, 391 U.S. 
at 572-73, leaving for courts in later cases the more difficult question of how to bal-
ance when disruptive speech is involved. See T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 581. 
In a work predating Pickering, Professor Emerson identified several major dif-
ficulties with an ad hoc balancing test for defining the freedom of expression, First, 
he noted that the test contains no hard core of doctrine to guide a court in reaching 
a decision in any particular case. Second, he argued that, if a court takes the test 
seriously, the factual determinations involved are so difficult and time-consuming that 
they are unsuitable for the judicial process. Third, he remarked that, since a court 
using the test is forced to base its decision on broad policy considerations usually 
deemed to be more appropriately determined by the legislature than the courts, the 
test gives almost conclusive weight to legislative judgment. ·Fourth, he asserted that 
the test gives no more protection to speech than would be provided by the due process 
clause. Finally, because no factual situation is definitely protected until the Supreme 
Court so decides, the test fails to provide notice and thus is not feasible from the 
standpoint of judicial administration. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the 
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 913-14 (1963), reprinted in T. EMERSON, To-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966). 
For the reasons noted above, Professor Emerson suggested that Pickering could be 
better read as announcing a constitutional test based on whether a worker's ex-
pression was incompatible with his commitments as a public employee. T. EMERSON, 
supra note 1, at 581. Another commentator has suggested that a better test would 
be simply whether a rational nexus existed between the offensive speech and the em-
ployment of the offender. Grossman, Public Employment and Free Speech: Can 
They Be Reconciled?, 24 Ao. L. REV. 109, 119 (1972). 
Although the courts have neither adopted Emerson's reading of Pickering nor 
abandoned the balancing test for a rational nexus approach, some courts, in determin-
ing the constitutionally protected status of offensive speech made by a public em-
ployee, have given great weight to the relationship between.such speech and the em-
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II. NONPARTISAN FREE SPEECH CASES 
INVOLVING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
371 
In the wake of Pickering, plaintiffs from all walks of public em-
ployment-·teachers,26 policemen,27 firemen,28 lawyers,29 and social 
workers30-have sought damages, reinstatement, or other equitable 
relief31 upon being discharged or otherwise penalized32 allegedly in 
ployee's employment responsibilities. For example, in Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 
4S6 (5th Cir. 1971) (alternative holding), the plaintiff class of firemen challenged 
the constitutionality of a city charter and ordinance provision restricting their politi-
cal expression and activities. In holding the restrictions unconstitutional as applied 
to proscribing the display of political bumper stickers on firemen's automobiles, the 
court determined that the display of a political bumper sticker was so unrelated to 
the performance of a fireman's duties that under Pickering he should be treated as 
a member of the general public. So viewed, the infringement on political activity 
was unjustified because the city had shown no compelling state interest supporting 
the restrictions. See also Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 74S (7th Cir. 1970); Pilarow-
ski v. Brown, 76 Mich. App. 666, 677, 2S7 N.W.2d 211, 217 (1977) ("[p]laintifrs 
criticism dealt with matters outside the scope of his activities within the depart-
ment"). But cf. Connealy v. Walsh, 412 F. Supp. 146, 15S (W.D. Mo. 1976) (ju-
venile court social worker may be discharged for displaying partisan bumper sticker 
on personal automobile used in her work in contravention of a regulation because 
this partisan speech would inhibit the establishment and maintenance of trust in 
troubled persons and would give the appearance of political partisanship in the opera-
tion of a court). 
For discussions about the utility of a balancing test in constitutional law, see gen-
erally the sources collected in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR. & J. CHoPER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 3S6-67 (4th ed. 197S). 
26. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, S49 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1976), discussed 
in note 67 infra. 
27. See, e.g., Brukiewa v. Police Commr., 2S7 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970), dis-
cussed in text at notes 144-47 infra. 
28. See, e.g., Janetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974). 
29. See, e.g., Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, S46 F.2d S60 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 937 (1977), discussed in text at notes 102-07 infra. 
30. See, e.g., Chalk Appeal, 441 Pa. 376, 272 A.2d 457 (1971), discussed in note 
66 infra. 
31. Other equitable relief might include removal of any reference to the dis-
ciplinary action from the employee's employment records. See Aumiller v. Uni-
versity of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1309 (D. Del 1977). 
32. To raise a claim under Pickering, a public employee must show that he was 
denied a "valuable governmental benefit" because of his constitutionally protected 
speech. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Thus, the first amendment 
protection extends to nonrenewal of a public employee's contract even when he lacks 
a contractual or tenurial right to renewal, Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98, and to all ad-
ministrative sanctions, see, e.g., Adcock v. Board of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 60, 513 1>.2d 
900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1973 ), including a transfer that, although involving no loss 
of pay or status, removed the public employee from a position "uniquely suited to 
her talents and desires." Bernasconi v. Temple Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 548 
F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1977). 
The Supreme Court has recently stated tp.at, although a public employer may de-
cline to renew an employee's contract for "no reason whatever," he may not deny 
renewal in retribution for the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). The 
first portion of this comment undercuts the proposition asserted in Lowy, Co11Stitu-
tio11al Limitations 011 the Dismissal of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN L. RBv. 1, 
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violation of their free speech rights. In defense of its disciplinary 
action, the public employer has usually maintained that the sanction 
was proper because it was imposed for reasons unrelated to the 
speech, 33 or because the speech demonstrated some undesirable 
trait-such as incompetence, 34 insubordination, 35 or disloyalty36-in 
the employee, or because the speech threatened or resulted in dis-
ruption of governmental operations.37 The first defense attempts to 
bypass any balancing, since a sanction imposed for nonspeech rea-
sons does not trigger the balancing test. The second defense, if un-
critically accepted by the courts, may likewise skirt the balancing 
test. Thus, in order to protect the employee's freedom of expression 
adequately, the courts should require the government to prove that 
the speech actually demonstrated the allegedly undesirable trait. 
Furthermore, at least where insubordination or disloyalty is alleged, 
the balancing test should be employed to determine whether the em-
ployee's performance is sufficiently impeded to justify the sanction. 
The third defense-that the speech ·threatened or resulted in dis-
ruption of governmental operations-most clearly activates the bal-
ancing test. Because these three defenses are by no means mutually 
exclusive, the lower courts' task in determining and balancing the 
competing interests is often extremely difficult. 38 
26-28 (1976), that dismissal or denial of employment on grounds that are arbitrary, 
capricious, or unrelated to job performance is in contravention of due process of law. 
In addition, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), where the Court stated that, 
absent an allegation that the public employer had been motivated by a desire to pun-
ish the exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights, the Court would 
presume that the official action was regular. In so holding, the majority asserted 
that the federal court is not the appropriate forum for reviewing even erroneous offi-
cial actions of this sort, 426 U.S. at 349-50, which might indicate that the courts 
need not entertain such claims alleging violation of due process. 
33. See, e.g., Caffas v. Board of School Directors, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 578, 353 
A.2d 898 (1976) (teacher dismissed because of cruel treatment of students, not be-
cause of statements critical of the school administration). 
34. See, e.g., Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Socy., 445 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 1971), 
discussed in text at notes 74-75 infra. Incompetency would include inability or un-
willingness to perform required functions. 
35. See, e.g., Phillips v. Adult Probation Dept., 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1974), 
discussed in text at notes 78-82 infra. 
36. See, e.g., Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 11976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 937 (1977), discussed in text at notes 102-07 infra. 
37. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed 
in text at notes 76-77 infra. 
38. Some courts have avoided applying the Pickering balancing test by invalidat-
ing departmental regulations restricting the public employee's freedom of expression 
on due process overbreadth or vagueness grounds. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 
F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971) (alternative holding). Several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions seemingly restrict the usage of these rationales, however. In United States 
Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), 
the Court rejected charges of vagueness and overbreadth in upholding the constitu-
tionality of the provision in § 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976), 
that prohibits federal employees from taking "an active part in political management 
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Teachers have been involved in many of the post-Pickering cases 
dealing with nonpartisan free speech of public employees. In light 
of the unique considerations that arise in the context of teacher em-
- or in political campaigns." In a companion case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601 (1973 ), the Court rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges and upheld the 
constitutionality of OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 818 (1971), a provision of the Oklahoma 
equivalent to the Hatch Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §§ 801-839 (1971), that restricted 
the political activities of the state's employees. The Court in Broadrick stated that, 
"particularly where [political] conduct and not merely speech is involved, we be-
lieve that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, 
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 413 U.S. at 615 (em-
phasis added). In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the Supreme Court up-
held the dismissal of an employee who had made a defamatory statement about a 
superior. In so doing, the Court held that the provision of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act 
allowing for the discharge of a federal civil service employee "for such cause as will 
promote the efficiency of the service," 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1976), was not unconsti-
tutionally vague, given the intent of Congress to lay down a general rule "in order to 
give myriad different federal employees performing widely disparate tasks a common 
standard of job protection." 416 U.S. at 159. Finally, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733 (1974), an Army physician was court-martialed for, inter' alia, making public 
statements that urged black enlisted men to refuse to go to Vietnam and that casti-
gated the integrity of Special Forces personnel. In upholding his conviction, the 
Court held that Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 
U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970), dealing with prohibitions against "conduct unbecoming 
an officer and a gentleman." 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970), and "disorders and neglects 
to the prejudice of good order and discipline," 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970), were not 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The Court found that the construction given 
these phrases by the military courts and by military customs and usages created ade-
quate specificity for these provisions, taking into account the nature of the military 
as a specialized society with a " 'jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from 
the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.'" 417 U.S. at 744 (quot-
ing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. iB7, 140 (1953)). 
Nonetheless, several subsequent lower court decisions have invalidated depart• 
mental regulations on overbreadth or vagueness grounds. For example, in Bence v. 
Breier, 501 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1975), the plain• 
tiff police officers, who were also union officials, were disciplined for expressing em-
ployment grievances to the city's chief labor negotiator without first consulting super-
ior officers, as required by a departmental rule. The Seventh Circuit held that tht' 
rule under which the plaintiffs were sanctioned-a prohibition against "conduct unbe-
coming a member and detrimental to the service"-was unconstitutionally vague on 
its face and therefore could not justify the discipline. 501 F.2d at 1190, 1193. The 
court distinguished Parker by stating that, although the phrase "conduct unbecoming 
an officer and a gentleman" under scrutiny in that case might have developed a well-
settled meaning in the military context, that meaning was not transferable to a civil-
ian police department regulation. 501 F.2d at 1191-92. The court also distinguished 
Arnett by stating that, unlike the provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the police 
department rule in question was not designed to apply uniformly to a large and dis-
parate group of employees, but rather was to govern only a homogeneous group of 
police department employees performing similar job functions. 501 F.2d at 1189-90. 
Alternatively, the Bence court held that, even if the rule were not unconstitutionally 
vague on its face, it was vague as applied to the plaintiffs because it did not provide 
notice that merely utilizing established labor-management communication channels 
fell within its coverage. 501 F.2d at 1193. 
In a decision nearly contemporaneous to Bence v. Breier, a different panel of the 
Seventh Circuit took a dissimilar tack by relying on Broadrick. In Herzbrun v. Mil-
waukee County, 504 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1974), the court refused to invalidate a 
seemingly unconstitutionally vague regulation because the plaintiff's "hard core" con-
duct came so clearly within the prohibitions of the regulation, however narrowly it 
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ployment39 and the extensive treatment given to the first amendment 
rights of teachers by legal commentators,40 this Note focuses upon 
the freedom of expression accorded governmental employees other 
than teachers, although cases involving teachers that are relevant to 
the broader spectrum of public employment are examined. Also, 
because of the nuances involved in determining "state action," 
no attempt will be made to define where public employment ends 
and private employment begins.41 Rather, once the requisite state 
action is assumed, the question becomes one of identifying the con-
stitutional limits on discipline imposed in response to a public em-
ployee's expression. 
might be construed, that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the rule for vague-
ness. 504 F.2d at •1193. The court also found plaintiffs overbreadth argument 
to be without merit, concluding that any overbreadth in the regulation could be cured 
on a case-by-case basis. 504 F.2d at 1195-96. 
For an analysis of the constitutional doctrines competing for application in the 
Bence and Herzbrun cases, see 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1298 (1975). 
39. These special considerations include the distinction that is often drawn be• 
tween speech made in class and that made outside of class, which goes beyond the 
less specific distinction between on-the-job and off-the-job speech that is applied to 
nonteachers. In addition, the interest of the state in protecting juveniles creates 
special concerns with the content of teachers' speech, at least at the elementary and 
high-school levels. See generally sources cited in note 40 infra. 
40. Several law review commentaries have dealt with judicial protection of 
teachers' speech made outside the classroom. See Note, 8 GA. L. REV. 900, supra 
note 8; Note, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1256, supra note 8. See generally Comment, Freedom 
of Speech of the Public School Teacher, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 392 (1970); Note, 
Teachers and the First Amendment, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 435 (197•1). For an ex-
amination of the teachers' freedom of expression inside the classroom, see Goldstein, 
The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers To Determine What 
They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976); Miller, Teachers Freedom of Ex-
pression Within the Classroom: A Search for Standards, 8 GA. L. REV. 837 (1974); 
Moskowitz & Casagrande, Teachers and the First Amendment: Academic Freedom 
and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 39 ALB. 
L. REV. 661, 662-94 (1975); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High 
School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032 (1971); 
Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968). See 
also Schauer, School Books, Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. RBV, 
287 (1976); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 
1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual 
Rights, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1447-54, 1456-65 (1976). 
41. A basic tenet of constitutional law is that "state action" is required to trigger 
the protections of the first amendment. For an excellent discussion of the considera-
tions that came into play in determining whether state action exists, see Note, State 
Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 
CoLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974). 
Federal jurisdiction in cases involving sanctions against public employees for non-
partisan speech is usually based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). A plaintiff alleging 
a § 1983 violation is generally not required to exhaust state administrative or judicial 
remedies prior to filing the federal court action. See, e.g., Hochman v. Board of 
Educ., 534 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1976), and cases cited therein. How-
ever, some authority exists for the proposition that, under some circumstances, state 
administrative remedies must be exhausted before a federal court will entertain the 
claim. See cases collected in Moskowitz & Casagrande, supra note 40, at 695 n.198, 
For a recent case that has recognized a cause of action directly under the four-
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A. Causation in Employee Discharge Cases: The Empluyee's 
Initial Burden and the Employer's Initial Defense 
375 
In the typical post-Pickering case, the employee was required to 
establish that his speech was protected under the balancing test and 
had been a factor leading to the sanction he received. Until the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle,42 however, disagreement existed re-
garding the nature of the causal relationship the employee was re-
quired to show between his protected speech and any discipline im-
posed by the public employer. Some courts held that wrongful dis-
cipline could be found only if protected expression was the sole rea-
son for the sanction. 43 Other courts considered the sanction uncon-
stitutional even if it was only partially in response to protected ex-
pression. 44 A few courts took the intermediate view that the sanc-
tion was unlawful only if the protected speech constituted the pre-
dominant reason for the employee's discharge.45 Courts adopting 
the most stringent position-that any discipline designed even par-
tially to punish the protected exercise of a constitutional right is un-
lawful-maintained that a contrary holding would chill the exercise 
of constitutional rights by public employees and would allow a 
facially legitimate ground for termination to mask unconstitutional 
motives. 46 On the other hand, -courts favoring the sole or predomi-
nant motive test argued that a more stringent rule would allow a pub-
lic employee to ensure the permanency of his employment simply 
by engaging in constitutionally protected behavior.47 
teenth amendment for a claim based on dismissal of a public employee, see Gentile 
v. Wallen, No. 77-7093 (2d Cir., Sept. 15, 1977). 
42. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
43. Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1974); Parker v. 
Graves, 340 F. Supp. 586, 590 (N.D. Fla. 1972), atfd., 479 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1973). 
44. E.g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 573 
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of 
Pa., 520 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Simard 
v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. 
of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1971); Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 
1161, 1173-74 (Wyo. 1976). 
45. Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 1975); Franklin 
v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 446-47 (D. Colo. 1976), affd., 562 F.2d 1188 (10th 
Cir. 1977); Turbeville v. Abernathy, 367 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
46. See Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976), in which the 
court emphasized the importance of careful examination of alleged first amendment 
violations because of their potential chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional 
rights by other employees. 
47. Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 446 (D. Colo. 1976). Cf. Butler v. 
Hamilton, 542 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1976) ("public employee cannot expunge 
all prior transgressions from his employment record by merely exercising a constitu-
tional right"). 
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In Mt. Healthy,48 the Supreme Court resolved the conflict over the 
nature of the causal relationship the employee must show between his 
protected speech and the sanction imposed upon him. In ,that case 
Doyle, an untenured teacher who had previously ·been involved in sev-
eral disturbances, 49 had made a telephone call to a local radio station 
in which he had conveyed information contained in a memorandum 
he had received from his principal regarding teacher dress and appear-
ance. Shortly thereafter, the school board decided not to renew 
Doyle's employment contract. In response to his request for a state-
ment of the reasons for its decision, the board cited the "notable lack 
of tact in handling professional matters" demonstrated by his tele-
phone call to the radio station and by his use of obscene gestures 
to correct unruly students. 50 In an unpublished opinion, the federal 
district court ordered that Doyle be reinstated with back pay because 
the telephone call was clearly protected expression under Pickering 
and had played a substantial part in the board's decision not to re-
hire him. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this holding in an unpublished 
opinion.51 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Rehnquist, .the Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment and rejected the rationale of the district 
court's opinion, which would hold unconstitutional any employment 
termination decision based in substantial part on protected behavior. 
This rule, according to Justice Rehnquist, would require reinstate-
ment in cases where the public employment decisionmaker would 
have dismissed the employee even if the constitutionally protected 
incident had not occurred, and thus it could place an employee who 
engages in a constitutionally protected activity in a better position 
than one who does not. The Court then stated that the proper 
causation test in an employee discharge case first places the burden 
of proof upon the employee to show that his expression was constitu-
tionally protected and was a substantial or "motivating factor"52 in 
48. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
49. The trial court found that Doyle, who happened to be the past president and 
a member of the executive committee of the "Teacher's Association," had been in-
volved in an altercation with another teacher, had argued with employees of the 
school cafeteria over the amount of spaghetti that they had served him, and had re-
ferred to students, in connection with a disciplinary complaint, as "sons of bitches." 
429 U.S. at 281-82. 
50. 429 U.S. at 282-83. The school board apparently did not specifically rely 
on the other instances of misconduct, see note 49 supra, to justify Doyle's dismissal, 
51. No. 75-1382 (<ith Cir. Dec. 10, 1975) (unpublished opinion noted at 529 F.2d 
524) .. 
52. The Court defined "motivating factor" by citing its contemporaneous decision 
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). 429 U.S. at 287 n.2. In Arlington Heights, the Court refused to define 
that term as the "sole," "dominant," or "primary" factor leading to official action. 
429 U.S. at 265. Rather, the Court in that case simply stated that determining 
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the public employer's disciplinary decision. The second stage of the 
test, adopted to avoid what the Court viewed as bestowing an unfair 
benefit upon employees who engage in protected activities, expands 
the causation analysis so that the employee's initial showing does not 
terminate the inquiry. Rather, at that point the burden merely shifts 
to the employer to prove that it would have reached the same deci-
sion regarding the worker's continued employment in the absence of 
the constitutionally protected behavior. 53 In effect, the Court 
adopted the district court's "substantial factor" rule as a threshold 
test, to be followed by a "but for" causation analysis. 
The causation test adopted in Mt. Healthy seems fair from the 
standpoint of the discharged public employee, because it places him 
in the same position vis-a-vis the employer that he would have occu-
pied had no protected speech been involved.:H The Mt. Healthy test 
appears less acceptable, however, when its overall impact is scrutinized. 
First, the Court in Mt. Healthy did not adequately recognize that 
the causation test could have a chilling effect on the freedom of ex-
pression of Doyle's co-workers, who, because they might not under-
stand the nuances of the test,55 could view the result in Mt. Healthy 
whether an unconstitutional purpose, which in Arlington Heights was alleged -i!k__ 
vidious racial discrimination, was a motivating factor in the government's action re-
quires a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available," such as the impact of the action, the historical background of the 
decision, departures from normal procedural or substantive policy, and legislative and 
administrative history. 429 U.S. at 266. For a discussion of recent Supreme Court 
cases adopting a similar test for proving racial discrimination in violation of the 
equal protection clause, see Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose 
Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. 
Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 725 (1977). 
In employee discharge cases after Mt. Healthy, factors indicating improper mo-
tivation for discharge might include the pretextual nature of the unprotected bases 
for the action and the discriminatory application of rules. Cf. Mabey v. Reagan, 
537 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (pre-Mt. Healthy decision noting these factors 
as indicating improper motivation). 
53. 429 U.S. at 287. 
54. Even under the Mt. Healthy test, an employee dismissed for constitutionally 
impermissible grounds might be in a slightly better position than he would be if no 
protected behavior were involved. Generally an untenured teacher such as Doyle is 
considered to have no constitutionally protected interest in having his contract re-
newed and thus can be discharged for no reason whatsoever. See note 32 supra. 
However, by proving that a substantial reason for the employment termination de-
cision was his constitutionally protected activity, the employee forces the state to 
show that the employment would have been terminated even absent the protected ac-
tivity. Since presumably the state will sometimes have difficulty making this show-
ing, placing this burden on the employer improves the employee's position relative to 
what it would have been had the state not impermissibly retaliated against his exercise 
of a protected right. In addition, conscientious courts are likely to be skeptical of 
after-the-fact rationales for termination. See Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 
434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977), discussed in notes 59-64 infra and accompanying 
text; Muir v. County Council, 393 F. Supp. 915, 933 (D. Del. 1975), discussed in 
note 58 infra. 
55. Of course, such employees might not appreciate the nuances of the Pickering 
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as explicit judicial recognition that the government can punish em-
ployees because they have engaged in constitutionally protected ex-
pression. More important, the Court apparently failed to recognize 
that it is the state's attempt to punish constitutionally protected be-
havior, not the employee's exercise of 'a constitutional right, that 
places the worker in a better position under the district court's test. 
Under the test adopted in Mt. Healthy, the state will often have 
nothing to lose by considering the employee's speech in its decision 
to terminate employment. If the employee successfully challenges 
the sanction-and probably few employees do litigate their dismis-
sals-the state may show at trial that it would have reached the same 
decision in the absence of the protected speech. Under the analysis 
adopted by the lower court in Mt. Healthy, a public employer is free 
to treat an employee who engages in constitutionally protected activi-
ties as it would any other employee, but it could not allow such 
employee behavior to motivate disciplinary action. Thus, unlike the 
Supreme Court's two-stage test, the lower court's test would deter the 
public employer from ever discharging an employee for constitution-
ally protected activity. 
One difficulty with this deterrence analysis is that it assumes that 
the public employer can differentiate between protected and unpro-
tected speech, a determination requiring the application of the 
Pickering balancing test. In addition, it is perhaps unreasonable to 
require the employer to make the reasoned judgments called for by 
Pickering in the face of a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident.60 
This shortcoming in rational decisionmaking, which is not addressed 
by the Mt. Healthy test, can be remedied, however-employees would 
be better protected if the employment termination decision were 
turned over to an unbiased official or committee.67 
The application of the Mt. Healthy test raises the further danger 
that the protection offered ·by Pickering will be diluted if, once the 
employee has shown that his dismissal was due in substantial part 
to his protected speech, the public employer is allowed to offer fic-
titious though facially permissible grounds for the discharge. 58 To 
balancing test either, and thus they could be discouraged from engaging in constitu-
tionally protected expression by the permissible sanctions imposed upon employees 
whose speech does not meet the Pickering standard. 
56. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285. 
57. Cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (a criminal defen-
dant charged by the judge at the end of his trial with contempt because of his slander-
ous attacks upon that judge is entitled to a public trial on those charges before an-
other judge, since "[n]o one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm de• 
tachment necessary for fair adjudication"). 
58. See Muir v. County Council, 393 F. Supp. 915, 933 (D. Del. 1975), a pre-
Mt. Healthy case in which the court stated that 
[o]nce the [Pickering] balance is struck, the government may not demonstrably 
retaliate against the employee for the exercise of his right to free speech or assoc1• 
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avoid this unconstitutional result, courts should carefully scrutinize 
the evidence offered by the employer to prove that the employee 
would have been dismissed even in the absence of the constitution-
ally protected activity. The recent case of Aumiller v. University 
of Delaware59 illustrates the careful judicial inquiry that should be 
required under Mt. Healthy. After determining that the university's 
decision not to renew Aumiller's employment contract was based 
solely on his protected statements about homosexuality, 60 the court 
went on to consider the university's contention that it would not have 
renewed the contract even in the absence of the protected speech. 61 
In finding the university's claim unpersuasive, the court rejected as 
weak and speculative the university's evidence that Aumiller's posi-
tion would not have been funded for budgetary reasons or that, as-
suming appropriate funding, he would have been no more than a 
nonpreferred applicant because of the university's need to conduct 
an affirmative action search before filling the position. 62 Noting that 
"neither of these reasons was ever suggested throughout the entire 
grievance proceeding,"63 the court was understandably skeptical of 
the employer's attempt to rely on Mt. Healthy to justify the nonre-
newal.64 
B. The Pickering Balancing Test in Operation 
Although Mt. Healthy has clarified the causation issue, courts ap-
plying the Pickering balancing test still must make a case-by-case 
resolution of the relative weight to be assigned various governmental 
and free speech interests. This section critically examines some of 
the competing interests that have attracted judicial attention in em-
ployee discipline cases. Categorization of these interests is difficult, 
however, and courts should guard against giving improper emphasis 
to any single governmental interest mentioned in the Pickering opiJ?.-
ion. 
ation and attempt to camouflage that retaliation by after the-fact-make-weight 
reasons that would otherwise justify his dismissal. 
59. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977). 
60. 434 F. Supp. at 1302. 
61. Unlike the situation-in Mt. Healthy, where the public employer relied on the 
employee's constitutionally unprotected conduct to show that he would have been dis-
charged even if he had not made the protected expression, the university in Aumiller 
argued that institutional concerns existed that would have led to the employee's dis-
missal regardless of his speech. See text at note 62 infra. 
62. 434 F. Supp. at 1308. 
63. 434 F. Supp. at 1308 n.98. 
64. The record in Aumiller indicates that at least one university administrator 
was aware of the potential constitutional ramifications of the decision not to renew 
and urged that a facially valid justification-such as budgetary constraints-be ad-
vanced for the action: 434 F. Supp. at 1285. 
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With a few exceptions, 65 the courts have read Pickering to 
require that, before· sanctions can constitutionally be imposed under 
the balancing test, the public employer must prove that the 
employee's expression either caused or will cause some actual im-
pairment of a governmental interest. 66 This requirement operates 
as a presumption that the employee's speech has value and thus can-
not be suppressed absent some actual harm to the government. 
Some courts have strengthened this presumption by utilizing a more 
stringent constitutional standard under which the speech-based dis-
cipline cannot stand unless the expression materially and substan-
65. Some courts have upheld employee discharges without any showing that ac-
tual impairment of the governmental interest resulted from the employee's expression. 
See Note, 8 GA. L. REV. 900, supra note 8, at 903-04, 906-07, 910-17; Note, 59 IowA 
L. REv. 1256, supra note 8, at 1265-68, 1272-76, 1279-80. This result is probably 
justified where a showing is made that the employee's speech threatens violent disrup-
tion of governmental operations. See Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 491 F. 
2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974), discussed in Note, 59 IowA L. REV. 1256, supra note 8, at 
1266. It has been suggested that, absent proof that a governmental interest has been 
impaired; courts have used a, "clear and present danger of disruption" standard to 
determine whether public employee expression may be restricted. See id. at 1266-
68. , See also Fisher v. Walker, 464 F.2d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 1972) (Doyle, J., 
. dissenting). 
Occasionally courts have avoided finding actual impairment by concluding that the 
content of the employee's expression ipso facto interferes with the operations of the 
governmental employer. See, e.g., Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 996 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (alternative holding), in which the court held that, where clearly insub-
ordinate remarks by an employee had "manifestly threatened significant working rela-
tionships vital to the administration of the school," no evidence regarding any result-
ing impairment of governmental operations need be introduced at the dismissal hear• 
ing. 
66. A showing of actual detrimental impact might not be required if the state-
ments were knowingly or recklessly false. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying 
text. Absent such statements most courts require a showing of actual impairment 
of governmental interests to justify discipline. See, e.g., Tygrett v. Washington, 543 
R2d 840, 845-50 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (summary judgment for employer held inappro• 
priate because the judgment lacked a judicial determination that the plaintiff police• 
man's statement that he would violate departmental rules if a police labor dispute 
was not resolved detrimentally affected the efficiency of the officer or the police 
force in rendering service to the community); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 
285, 290 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (employee's speech could not 
justify dismissal because it had not interfered with production at defendant's plant) ; 
Dendor v. Board of Fire·& Police Commrs., 11 Ill. App. 3d 5821 588-90, 298 N.E. 
2d 316, 321-22 (1973) (fireman's statement before village trustees in public meeting 
criticizing his superior held protected because reviewing board made no finding of 
fact that the expression had an adverse effect on the fire department); In re Gioglio, 
104 NJ. Super. 88, 98-101, 248 A2d 570, 575-76 (1968) (policeman's critical assess-
ment of the police department in newspaper article held protected because no showing 
was made that the publication of the article impaired or disrupted the efficiency of 
the department); Chalk Appeal, 441 Pa. 376, 383-85, 272 A.2d 457, 460-61 (1971) 
(public assistance caseworker's public statements to welfare recipients urging them 
to pressure their caseworkers and demand their rights held protected because no evi-
dence had been produced showing any harmful effects of the speech); Note, 8 GA, 
L. REv. 900, supra note 8, at 903-04, 906-07, 910-17; Note, 59 IowA L. REv, 1256, 
supra note 8, at 1265-68, 1272-76, 1279-80. 
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tially impaired the governmental interest. 67 Of course, a finding of 
"actual"-or even "material and substantial"-impairment does not 
end the inquiry under Pickering. The balancing process requires 
the trier of fact not only to determine the existence and extent of 
any harm to the governmental interest resulting from the disciplined 
67. See Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1047-50 (9th Cir. 1976) (college 
faculty member's expression before academic senate can justify dismissal only if it 
substantially and materially disrupted the meeting and his subsequent relations with 
the administration and faculty); Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 518 (5th Cir. 
1974) (clinical psychologist employed at a Veterans Administration hospital may be 
discharged for wearing a '"peace pin" on the job, because in this peculiar therapeutic 
environment this form of symbolic speech presented a material and substantial inter-
ference with the performance of his duties); Smith V'. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th 
Cir. 1973) ( en bane) (if professor shows he was discharged for his exercise of con-
stitutional rights, the state assumes the burden of proving that his acts materially and 
substantially interfered with the discipline required in the school's operation); Los 
Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 563, 455 
P.2d 827, 835, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 73'1 (1969) (teachers could circulate petition re-
lating to the financing of public education during their duty-free lunch periods be-
cause school officials had "failed to demonstrate the existence of 'facts which might 
reasonably have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption of or material interf er-
ence with school activities'") (emphasis original) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)); Board of Trustees 
v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1176 (Wyo. 1976) (teacher may not be discharged for 
statements published in connection with union activities unless such expression "sub-
stantially interfered with the requirements and discipline in the operation of the 
school"). Cf. Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1971) (if a black 
policeman could show that he had been discharged or forced to resign because of 
the exercise of his constitutional right to allow two white female antipoverty workers 
to board at his home, the burden would then rest on the public employer to show 
that this conduct would materially and substantially impair his usefulness as a police 
officer). See also Abbott v. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.), revd. en bane, 534 
F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977), in which both the 
panel majority opinion and dissenting opinion would have required a finding of ma-
terial and substantial interference. The Abbott case dealt in part with whether the 
filing of a legal action by a public employee against his employer is a form of ex-
pression. The case did not satisfactorily resolve the matter, however, because the 
panel dissenting opinion, which was adopted per curiam as the en bane opinion, 
raised more questions than it answered on this issue. 
For other cases discussing whether the filing of a suit can be a protected form 
of expression under Pickering, see O'Brien v. Shimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. 
Ill. 1973) (records clerk in sheriff's office may not be discharged for filing suit 
against the sheriff alleging sex discrimination in failing to hire her as a deputy patrol 
officer); Norton v. City of Santa Ana, 15 Cal. App. 3d 419, 426-28, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
37, 41-42 (197•1) (filing suit as personal vendetta against a superior not protected); 
Paris v. Civil Serv. Commn., 32 Colo. App. 21, 510 P.2d 910, 913 (1973), affd., 
184 Colo. 207, 519 P.2d 323 (1974) (filing of suit characterized as "conduct" that 
in part justified dismissal); Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85 N.M. 708, 516 P.2d 679 
(1973) (school bus driver's filing of suit contesting school board election held pro-
tected). Somewhat analogous cases have held that testimony before a judicial or ad-
ministrative body may give rise to constitutional protection against dismissal from 
public employment. See Hirsch v. Green, 368 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (D. Md. 1973) 
(grand jury testimony); Crawford v. City or Houston, 386 F. Supp. 187, 193 (S.D. 
Tex. 1974) (testimony in court); Lichtensteiger v. Housing & Dev. Administration, 
40 App. Div. 2d 810, 810, 338 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202-03 (1972) (testimony before plan-
ning commission). Cf. Cole v. Choctow County Bd. of Educ., 471 F.2d 777, 779 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973) (discussion with ·Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation agents regarding school desegregation held protected). 
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employee's speech, but also to weigh that impairment against the 
worker's and the public's interest in the speech. 68 
1. Incompetency and Work Philosophy 
The courts have occasionally applied the Pickering balancing ap-
proach where the employee's expression evidences personal char-
acteristics that either suggest incompetence or indicate a willingness 
to act contrary to a required work philosophy. 00 In such cases, the 
speech does not disrupt the efficient functioning of the government 
so much as it calls into question the employee's qualifications for his 
position. Magill v. Board of Regents70 provides an example of em-
ployee speech held to indicate incompetence. In that case, a uni-
versity professor alleged that he had been denied tenure as a result 
of his constitutionally protected expression. In holding that no con-
stitutional violation had occurred, the Fifth Circuit upheld the uni-
versity's determination that, since the professor had made false state-
ments71 when he easily could have ascertained the truth, he had 
demonstrated that he lacked the character and intellectual respon-
sibility required of a tenured professor. 72 This notion that com-
petency includes personal character and integrity would also appear 
68. ·For a discussion of balancing where both the factors weighing in favor of 
the employee and those weighing in favor of the government are significant, see text 
at notes 102-19 infra. 
69. Although some courts have applied Pickering to speech that demonstrates em-
ployee incompetence, the Court's language does not compel application of a balanc-
ing approach in such a case. The Court noted that the case before it did 
not present a situation in which a teacher's public statements are so without 
foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the class-
room. In such a case, of course, the statements would merely be evidence of 
the teacher's general competence. or lack thereof, and not an independent basis 
for dismissal. 
391 U.S. at 573 n.5. 
By treating an employee's speech as merely evidence of incompetence, an em-
ployer might be able to avoid the Pickering test and discharge an employee for in-
competency or, for that matter, for no reason at all. Although normally such a dis-
missal would be permissible, see note 32 supra, the courts should carefully scrutinize 
the employer's actions in such a case to ensure that the protection granted employee 
speech by Pickering has not been circumvented. See text following note 73 infra. 
70. 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976). 
71. As noted -earlier, Pickering held that false statements that resulted in no im-
pairment of the governmental interest were to be measured by the New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan libel test. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text; Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974). The court in Magill did not hold that Magill's 
speech violated this knowing or reckless falsehood standard. 
Several cases following Pickering have overturned an employee dismissal because 
his false statements neither harmed the government nor were libelous. See, e.g., 
Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 
475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410'U.S. 955 (1973); Tepedino v. Dumpson, 24 
N.Y.2d 705, 249 N.E.2d 751, 301 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1969). 
72. 541 F.2d at 1085. 
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to be applicable to other public employees whose positions require 
public trust and confidence. 73 
The analysis employed in Magill is open to abuse, since under 
it the defendant public employer might assert-and the court might 
uncritically accept-an argument based on incompetency when the 
actual reason for discharge violated the dismissed employee's first 
amendment rights under the Pickering balancing test. To avoid 
weakening the protection afforded by the Pickering balance, courts 
should, conclude that an employee's speech demonstrates incom-
petency only upon a clear showing both that the expression evidences 
a particular attribute and that the attribute conflicts with the require-
ments of the employee's position. 
It appears that some courts have found that certain positions held 
by public employees require them to maintain a work philosophy in 
accord with job requirements, regardless of what their personal 
philosophy might be. In these circumstances, employee expression 
indicating a willingness to act contrary to a justified work philosophy 
might demonstrate the inability to carry out job responsibilities. For 
example, in Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society,74 a legal aid criminal de-
fense attorney was discharged after making a statement to the effect 
that even if a client of the legal aid society were guilty, the society 
should eschew plea bargaining and take the case to trial on the 
chance that it might win. In upholding the attorney's dismissal, the 
Second Circuit found that Lefcourt's statement provided sufficient 
grounds for the society to conclude that he was unable and unwilling 
to implement various society policies and that "he was not represent-
ing and would not represent the best interests of [the society's] 
clients."75 
Adherence to a justified work philosophy is especially critical 
when the employee commonly deals with a sensitive clientele. In 
this situation, the worker's failure to adhere to the philosophy might 
impede the performance of his duties, even if it does not indicate 
an unwillingness to carry out the tasks assigned to him. For ex-
ample, in Smith v. United States,76 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a sum-
mary judgment that a clinical psychologist employed by a Veterans 
Administration hospital to provide therapeutic treatment for veterans 
in need of emotional rehabilitation could be discharged for ·wearing 
a "peace pin," because in this peculiar environment this symbolic 
73. That the weight accorded by the Pickering balancing test to statements can 
vary depending upon the employment position of the speaker is also relevant to the 
protection given disclosures of governmental improprieties. See text at notes 116-
19 infra. 
74. 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971). 
15. 445 F.2d at 1153. 
76. 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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speech "presented a material and substantial interference with the 
performance of [his] duties."77 
The rationale employed in Smith might have justified the suspen-
sion in Phillips v. Adult Probation Department.18 In that case, a 
deputy probation officer had placed a poster on his office wall that 
favorably depicted H. Rap Brown, Angela Davis, and Eldridge 
Cleaver, all of whom were fugitives from the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation at the time. The display of this poster might have im-
peded the officer's ability to encourage his clientele-who pre-
sumably met with him in his office and therefore could observe the 
poster-to obey court orders and legal agreements faithfully. 70 Al-
though Phillips can be read as adopting this analysis, 80 the opinion 
is not entirely clear on this point. An alternative reading of the 
opinion might suggest that, because the employee's continued dis-
play of the poster contravened his superior's order to remove it and 
indicated support for fugitives from justice, he had demonstrated a 
lack of the proper respect for authority required of such a probation 
officer.81 If applied uncritically, this alternative rationale would im-
properly restrict the freedom of expression of public employees who 
hold sensitive positions, for even these persons should be allowed 
to speak out on public issues and to respond critically to the orders 
of superiors so long as they can separate their duty to clients on the 
one hand from their personal philosophy and their dispute with the 
supervisor on the other. 82 
77. 502 F.2d at 518. Analogous situations include the impact a teacher's ex-
pression can have in the classroom upon his "sensitive clientele," school children. 
See, e.g., Project, supra note 40, at 1447-55. But cf. James v. Board of Educ., 461 
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972) (upholding in-class symbolic speech rights of teachers). 
78. 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1974 ). 
79. The plaintiff in Phillips maintained that the poster actually facilitated his 
work with the office's clientele because many minority people with whom he dealt 
would, upon observing the poster, identify strongly with him and be more willing to 
talk and listen to him. 491 F.2d at 953 n.3. 
80. See Connealy v. Walsh, 412 F. Supp. 146, 155-56 (W.D. Mo. 1976). 
81. The court also relied on the finding that the display of the poster caused dis-
harmony among the plaintiff's fellow employees. 491 F.2d at 955. Any reliance 
on the alleged disharmony among co-workers to justify the five-day suspension in 
Phillips is suspect, for mere grumbling among fellow workers should not legitimate 
the suppression of expression. See text at notes 120-24 infra. 
82. This analysis would indicate that the decision in Johnson v. County of Santa 
Clara, 31 Cal. App. 3d 26, 106 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), might well have given insuffi-
cient attention to the suspended worker's freedom of expression. In Johnson, the 
plaintiff, a deputy probation officer, had been suspended for writing an "insubordin-
ate" poem defiant of his superior after the plaintiff had been transferred to another 
department against his will. The court upheld the suspension, finding that the tone 
and content of the poem were incompatible with the successful discharge of the plain-
tiff's duties, which included inculcating and fostering respect for authority among 
juveniles. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 34, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67. 
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The above cases suggest that courts have found the concept of 
work philosophy to be somewhat amorphous. Courts should, in a 
manner similar to that suggested earlier regarding the justification 
of discipline based on incompetency evidenced by employee speech, 83 
be careful not to rely on an apparent conflict between personal and 
work philosophy to justify discipline where the apparent conflict does 
not impede governmental operations or demonstrate ,that the em-
ployee is unqualified. Thus, for example, the court in Lef court 
should have more fully assessed whether the legal aid attorney was 
merely expressing a personal opinion or was also indicating that he 
intended to act in accordance with that opinion in defending clients. 
Although the results in Smith and Phillips appear justifiable be-
cause of the likelihood that the symbolic speech in each case would 
disrupt the relationship between the employee and the sensitive 
clientele, this rationale might be improperly extended to prohibit 
speech where the likelihood of actual disruption is highly specula-
tive. 84 Where evidence of the likelihood of interference is not 
clearly convincing, a court should resolve any doubt against the prior 
restraint and in favor of allowing the expression. Then, if the 
speech or personal philosophy does result in actual impairment of 
the employee's ability to deal with his clientele, the public employer 
should be allowed to limit further speech only to the extent necessary 
to cease ,the agitation of the clientele. In the final analysis, although 
the work philosophy requirements of certain types of public employ-
ment do not constitute the imposition of beliefs upon a captive audi-
ence85 because the employee voluntarily accepts the sensitive posi-
tion, the demise of the right-privilege distinction in constitutional 
law86 suggests that work philosophy restrictions should extend only 
so far as is clearly required for the job. 
83. See text following note 73 supra. 
84. Connealy v. Walsh, 412 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mo. 1976), exemplifies a situa-
tion where this rationale-that the potential disruption of a working relationship with 
sensitive clientele may justify discipline for an employee's expression-might have 
been carried too far. In Connealy, the court upheld the discharge of a social worker 
employed by a juvenile court for failure to remove a "McGovern" bumper sticker 
from her automobile. After noting that the plaintifrs employment responsibilities 
required a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with the juveniles needing as-
sistance, 412 F. Supp. at 151, the court was content to uphold the dismissal at least 
in part on the ground that "under some circumstances depending on the nature of 
the bumper sticker and the person receiving the counseling, a partisan political 
bumper sticker could have an adverse impact on the efficiency of the social worker." 
412 F. Supp. at 152 (emphasis added). The court did not directly conclude that the 
"McGovern" sticker would create such an adverse impact, but rather it suggested 
that "stickers supporting candidates of the Nazi party [and] Ku Klux Klan" might 
"arouse and inflame the emotions of plaintiffs' probationers." 412 F. Supp. at 156. 
85. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3•19 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(school children cannot be compelled to salute and pledge allegiance to the American 
flag). 
86. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text. 
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2. Discipline of Superiors, Duty of Loyalty, and Disclosure 
of Governmental Improprieties 
Whereas incompetency and work philosophy relate generally to 
the qualifications of an employee or to the working relationship be-
tween the employee and the clientele, maintenance of discipline by 
superiors and of a duty of loyalty relates more directly to the work-
ing relationship between the employer and the employee. A read-
ing of the relevant cases indicates that the alleged breach of a super-
ior's discipline is probably the most common ground upon which 
courts rely to justify the discharge of a public employee claiming first 
amendment protection, although the use of a balancing test based 
on the totality of the facts makes such assessments difficult. 
Insubordinate behavior is at best an amorphous concept, the am-
biguity of which is heightened by the balancing test's lack of clear 
notice regarding the limits of protected expression.87 Without the 
development of some clear standards by which to evaluate one's own 
expression, the possibility of reprisals under the rubric of "insub-
ordination" might well chill protected criticism of a public employer 
by an employee. One attempt to define "insubordination" is found 
in Nebraska Department of Roads Employees Association v. Depart-
ment of Roads. 88 In that case, the defendant discharged an em-
ployee for voicing his opinion in a private meeting of engineers 
that the state engineer and director of the roads department, with 
whom the employee did not have a close working relationship, 
was not qualified for his position. In rejecting the defendant's 
characterization of the employee's expression as "insubordination," 
the court stated that, where no close working relationship existed 
between the employee and the object of his criticism, insubordina-
tion meant disobedience of orders, infraction of rules, or unwilling-
ness to submit to authority. The court then concluded that the dis-
missal could not stand because the defendant had made no showing 
of employee disobedience of any order or directive of the state 
engineer or any other superior.89 
Even clear disobedience of rules or orders from superiors does 
not necessarily justify sanctioning a public employee. The constitu-
tionality of the rule or order itself must be determined if disobedi-
ence of it is to serve as a permissible basis for disciplinary action. 
The rule must not be constitutionally void for facial vagueness or 
87. See note 25 supra; text at note 38 supra. 
88. 364 F. Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973). 
89.- 364 F. Supp. at 256-57. The court cited Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 
399 (8th' Cir. 1972), as a case involving insubordination. The court stated that 
Ahern upheld a dismissal for "a teacher's refusal to teach economics rather than poli-
tics, in an economics class." 364 F. Supp. at 256. 
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overbreadth, 90 and as applied it must not unconstitutionally restrict 
the expression of the employee as judged under the Pickering bal-
ancing test.91 Thus, merely labeling an employee as "insubordinate" 
in no way helps resolve the constitutional issue involved in any par-
ticular case. Rather, the application of that term should be limited 
to an employee's failure to abide by a rule 1:hat prohibits, or refusal 
to obey an order to cease, a form of expression only when the ex-
pression itself is unprotected under Pickering. The maintenance of 
discipline by superiors over their subordinates is certainly in the pub-
lic interest, but the superiors have no cause to complain when their 
own wrongful stifling of constitutionally protected expression under-
mines supervisory control. 
For some types of public employment, however, the question of 
insubordination or disruption of the superior-subordinate relation-
ship is not so simple. Pickering acknowledged that the freedom of 
expression to which a public employee is entitled might vary with 
the degree of intimacy and loyalty inherent in his relationship with 
his superior.92 Illustratively; in Muir v. County Council,93 the court 
upheld the council's dismissal of the county administrator, who held 
his position by appointment of the council, for disagreeing in a coun-
cil meeting with the procedure of enactment and the substance of 
a policy supported by several council members. The Muir court 
90. See note 38 supra. In addition, see Gasparinetti v. Kerr, Nos. 76-1605 & 
76-1606 (3d Cir., Nov. 3, 1977) (police department regulation prohibiting members 
from publicly commenting unfavorably on departmental actions held to be facially 
overbroad); Steenrod v. Board of Engrs., 87 Misc. 2d 977, 979, 386 N.Y.S.2d 788, 
790 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (fire department regulation determined to be so overly broad that 
it almost completely suppressed fireman's freedom of speech). 
91. See, e.g., Brukiewa v. Police Commr., 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970) 
(policeman's televised criticism of police department in violation of departmental rule 
held protected under Pickering). 
92. See Coven, The First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees, 
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559 (1977); text at note 15 supra. In addition to the 
cases discussed in the text, see Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1!>76) 
(governor may dismiss a policymaking official, in this case a member of state mu-
seum board of regents, for "political reasons"); Gould v. Walker, 356 F. Supp. 421 
(N.D. III. 1973) (governor may remove high-ranking official in Governor's Office of 
Human Resources for making uncomplimentary remarks about the governor during a 
political campaign); Bennett v. Thomson, ·116 N.H. 453, 363 A.2d 187 (1976) (plain-
tiff director of State Division of Economic Development may be discharged by gov-
ernor and state executive council for criticism of governor's decisions that seriously 
compromised plaintiffs ability to carry out his responsibilities). As evidenced by 
these three cases, questions involving a duty of loyalty may overlap with those re-
garding patronage dismissals of governmental employees. See Pilarowski v. Brown, 
76 Mich. App. 666, 678-79, 257 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (1977). Although apparently 
the three-Justice plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), would 
hold that all patronage dismissals violate the first and fourteenth amendments, 427 
U.S. at 368-73, Justices Stewart and Blackiilun, concurring in the judgment, agreed 
only that ·dismissals of "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential" employees solely on the-
grounds of their political beliefs violated the Constitution. 427 U.S. at 375. 
93. 393 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1975). 
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recognized that the freedom of a high-ranking governmental em-
ployee to make even truthful public criticism of superiors might be 
forfeited if the working relationship requires continued loyalty and 
is actually damaged by this criticism in a way that impairs the public 
interest . in governmental efficiency. The court stated that the 
necessity for and extent of this forfeiture was to be determined by 
balancing the competing interests of the employee and the public. 04 
Turning to the facts of the case, the court first found that Muir's 
position' as head of the county's administrative hierarchy required a 
close :working relationship with council members and a strong loyalty 
to the council. The court then determined that Muir's relationship 
with the council had been substantially disrupted by his personality 
conflicts with and opposition to the proposals of some of the mem-
bers. Finally, the court determined that this disruptive effect out-
weighed Muir's free speech interest and thus that his dismissal was 
justified. 05 
An employee's breach of her duty of loyalty my impair her effec-
tiveness in carrying out the employer's policies as well as in working 
with her superiors. For example, in Leslie v. Philadelphia 1976 
Bicentennial Corp., 96 the defendant dismissed its coordinator of com-
munity de~elopment for publicly charging its leaders with racism. 
The court found that these statements had seriously impaired the 
plaintiff's effectiveness in discharging her responsibilities for foster-
ing good relations between 1he black community and her employer. 
The court concluded that this loss of effectiveness, coupled with the 
defendant's belief ,that the plaintiff could no longer work effectively 
with its board members and staff, provided adequate justification for 
her dismissal in light of the high degree of cooperation and loyalty 
required by the sensitive nature of her duties. 97 
Muir and Leslie suggest that courts have been inclined to en-
force stri(?tly 1he duty of loyalty in cases involving employees who 
hold sensitive or ;high-level positions. However, disloyal expression 
94. 393 F. Supp. at 933. 
95. 393 F. Supp. at 933-34. It is curious that, although the Muir court held that 
a high-ranking employee might lose his right to make truthful public criticism of his 
employer, 39.3 F: Supp. at 933, the court upheld Muir's discharge without actually 
finding that bis' statements were made publicly. 
Even though the Muir court expressed caution about after-the-fact, pretext grounds 
for dismissal, 393 F. Supp. at 933; see note 58 supra, the breach of loyalty test 
adopted by the court is perhaps particularly susceptible to pretext dismissals, for the 
court allowed an element of arbitrariness to enter the approved "balancing" process: 
"[U]nder the Pickering rule the public's interest in the efficient operation of govern-
ment may be protected despite the fact that the attitude of an elected superior in these 
circumstances may have been somewhat arbitrary or less than conciliatory." 393 F. 
Supp. at 934-35. 
96. 343 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afjd., 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973). 
97. 343 F. Supp. at 777. 
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that somehow impairs governmental efficiency should not be treated 
as per se justification for dismissal, because, as Pickering sug-
gested, 98 the public interest in •the informed opinions of employees 
on issues of public concern99 can weigh in favor of protecting speech 
98. See text at note 18 supra. 
99. Some courts have indicated that nonpublic expression by public employees 
does not trigger first amendment protection. For example, in Ayers v. Western Line 
Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nom. 
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 46 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 
3, 1978) (No. 77-1051), the court reversed the district court and upheld the dis-
missal of a school teacher, Bessie Givhan, who had made recommendations and 
criticisms to the principal concerning policies and practices of the school district 
that could be interpreted as evidencing racial discrimination. Even though the 
court conceded that the content of her speech related to an issue of public import, 
it concluded that the first amendment does not protect the private expression of 
a public employee, and thus it held that her dismissal need not be reviewed against 
the Pickering standard. 555 F.2d at 1318-19. For an excellent critique of the Ayers 
court's ruling and of its reliance on privacy cases for the proposition that "no one 
has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient," 555 F.2d at 1319, 
see Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc on Behalf of Ap-
pellee Bessie B. Givhan, Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
Although the Ayers court's distinction between the private and the public context 
of speech might be useful, its conclusion that "privately" delivered speech having con-
tent of public interest is never protected seems incorrect for at least two reasons. 
First, the public has an interest in promoting speech--even privately expressed 
speech-that conveys ideas of social importance, since this type of expression may 
result in action that affects the public interest. For example, Givhan's suggestion in 
Ayers that black employees be assigned to semiclerical positions instead of only to 
janitorial work, 555 F.2d at 1313, might well have prompted action that would have 
lessened the appearance, if not the practice, of racial discrimination by the school 
district. Although the public might have been better informed if she had aired her 
criticisms publicly rather than simply to her immediate supervisor, surely the public's 
interest in her expression justified application of the Pickering balancing test. So 
viewed, the degree to which the public interest in expression is influenced by whether 
the speech was made in a private context should simply be considered in the applica-
tion of the Pickering balance. Cf. Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 520 F.2d 1364, 
1368 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment interests associated with private state-
ments by professor on an issue of little public importance outweighed by disruptive 
impact on departmental functioning, but "entirely different considerations would 
come into play" if the statements had concerned an issue of public interest or had 
been delivered to the news media). 
Second, requiring public employees to publicize their criticisms or suggestions 
rather than to work through internal channels will often damage the interests of both 
the government and the employee. Since publicly expressed criticism will often result 
in disruption of governmental efficiency that could have been avoided had the ex-
pression been made privately, the government has an interest in encouraging the use 
of internal channels. Furthermore, because this disruption of efficiency weighs 
against the employee under the Pickering balancing test, he often will desire to make 
his criticism in a context where the public will not become agitated by it. Thus, 
it might be appropriate to afford greater protection to criticisms brought through 
proper channels. See Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
(pre-Pickering decision holding that only the New York Times libel standard limits 
the right of public employees to use agency channels to petition for redress of griev-
ances); Comment, Government Employee Disclosures of Agency Wrongdoing: Pro-
tecting the Right To Blow the Whistle, 42 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 530, 538-41 (1975). The 
analysis adopted by the Ayers court, on the other hand, forces a public employee 
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critical of public employers.100 The conflict between the public's 
interest in efficient government and its interest in the opinions of 
either to forfeit his protection under Pickering by making his criticism through in-
ternal channels or to risk losing under the Pickering balancing test by making his 
criticism publicly, which could result in a public uproar that would disrupt govern-
mental efficiency. Clearly, applying the Pickering balancing test to Givhan's state-
ments would have been the proper approach in Ayers, as can be seen in the cases 
from four circuits that have applied Pickering when considering the protected status 
of statements that have content of public interest and are made in a private context. 
See Ring v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Jannetta v. Cole, 
493 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339-40 
(10th Cir. 1973); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 
493 n.13 (7th Cir. 1972). For a good recent analysis that supports the protection of 
employee speech on public concerns delivered in a private context, see Pilkington v. 
Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465, 474-76 (D.R.!. 1977). 
It is also appropriate to analyze the variables of context and content on a more 
theoretical level. First, the Pickering balancing test clearly applies to public em• 
ployee speech, such as that in Pickering itself, made in a public context and having 
content of public interest. Second, public employee expression that is delivered pub-
licly but lacks content of public interest should also be balanced under Pickering 
against its disruptive impact-absent disruption, the employee should be treated as 
a private citizen, and as such his public expression may not be punished or prohibited 
merely because its content is not of pressing public importance, unless the speech falls 
within the narrowly defined categories of obscenity, fighting words, and defamation, 
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Third, as the above critique of the Ayers decision indicates, public employee speech 
that has public importance and is made in a private context should also come under 
the Pickering balancing test. 
The above analysis, which indicates that three types of public-employee expres-
sion-public context-public content, public context-private content, and private con• 
text-public content-all should trigger the Pickering balancing test, suggests that the 
remaining category of speech-private context-private content-is the least deserving 
of protection. According protection to this type of expression would require the em-
ployer to justify a dismissal for such speech in terms of Pickering. On the other 
hand, if protection were not extended to this type of expression, the employer would 
be able to dismiss with impunity any employee who makes such speech, whether or 
not the speech had an impact upon the governmental interest. Although neither re-
sult appears particularly compelling, the courts probably should hold that this type 
of speech is protected under Pickering, if for no other reason than to guard against 
chilling valid criticism of governmental functioning. See Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. 
Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. Va. 1977) (dismissal of teacher because she complained to 
school principal about classroom assignment held to violate her free speech rights). 
Even though the rationale of Ayers is indefensible, the result in that case might 
be justified by distinguishing between discipline designed to punish an employee for 
the content of her criticism and discipline designed to punish an employee for her 
conduct in making the expression-in this case, the repeated harassment of her super• 
visors with what were essentially the same criticisms and suggestions. Under this 
analysis, evidence that the public employer had tolerated the criticism for at least 
a short period of time before taking disciplinary action might suggest that harassment 
by the employee, rather than the content of the criticism, actually motivated the dis-
ciplinary action. Courts deciding these cases should carefully scrutinize the har• 
assing-conduct rationale, however, to ensure that it is not advanced to mask a desire 
to silence criticism. 
100. See, e.g., Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1970) (criti-
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informed public employees becomes most pronounced when such 
employees publicly disclose governmental improprieties.101 
The recent case of Sprague · v. Fitzpatrick102 provides a good 
illustration of the public policy problems involved when a high-rank-
ing employee's disloyal expression both disrupts governmental effi-
ciency and discloses apparent official improprieties. In that case 
Fitzpatrick, -the district attorney of Philadelphia County, discharged 
Sprague, his first assistant, after a controversy developed regarding 
the granting of probation to a criminal defendant whom Fitzpatrick 
had allegedly represented while engaged in private legal practice.108 
Sprague had told the news media that, contrary to public statements 
made by Fitzpatrick, his understanding-which apparently was 
accurate-was that Fitzpatrick himself had recommended the 
probation.104 The district court dismissed105 Sprague's action for 
damages, and the Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the trial 
court that the working relationship had been irreparably dis-
cism of military policies by a former WAC who interacts with many members of 
armed forces "may be especially valued by society"); Brukiewa v. Police Commr., 
257 Md. 36, 52-53, 263 A.2d 210, 218 (1970) (suggestion that government had 
heavier burden of showing its right to inhibit public statements by president of police-
man's union criticizing the police department when his statement dealt with matters 
of public importance about which he had "experienced expertise"); Pilarowski v. 
Brown, 76 Mich. App. 666, 677, 257 N.W.2d 211, 217 (1977) (assuming that the 
spending policies of the county board of commissioners were of questionable sound-
ness, plaintiff county employee "was performing a public service in bringing these 
matters to public view"); Chalk Appeal, 441 Pa. 376,384,272 A.2d 457, 461 (1971) 
(public assistance caseworker has a unique and valuable perspective from which to 
criticize the welfare system). 
101. See Comment, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 
64 CALIF. L. REv. 108, 113-16, 134-45 (1976); Comment, 42 u. CHI. L. REV. 530, 
supra note 99, at 530-38, 560-61. See generally WHISTLE BLOWING (R. Nader, J. 
Petkas & K. Blackwell eds. 1972). 
With regard to the public interest in disclosures of government improprieties, Jus-
tice Marshall, presumably referring to the Watergate scandal, has stated that "[t]he 
importance of Government employees' being assured of their right to freely comment 
on the conduct of Government, to inform the public of abuses of power and of the 
misconduct of their superiors, must be self-evident in these times." Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (1974) (dissenting opinion). 
102. 412 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa.), affd., 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977). 
103. The district court stated that Fitzpatrick had allegedly represented the de-
fendant at one time. 412 F. Supp. at 911. The court of appeals, on the other hand, 
asserted only that Fitzpatrick had once represented the defendant's codefendant on 
a federal blackmail charge. 546 F.2d at 562. 
104. On appeal, the Third Circuit took it as a matter of fact that Fitzpatrick "per-
sonally appeared before [the criminal defendant's] sentencing judge and recom-
mended probation." 546 F.2d at 562. 
105. The Third Circuit noted that the trial court had considered matters outside 
the pleadings and.thereby had conve*d the dismissal of the complaint into a grant 
of summary judgment. 546 F.2d at 563. 
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rupted.106 Asserting that the key question in applying Pickering was 
whether the employment relationship had been seriously disrupted, 
the Third Circuit stated that, although the public importance of 
Sprague's statement might be a factor to be weighed in favor of pro-
tecting his right to speak on matters of public concern, "[i]f the 
arousal of public controversy exacerbates the disruption of public 
service, then it weighs against, not for, first amendment protection 
in the Pickering balance."107 
In situations such as in Sprague, the public interest is best served 
if the unscrupulous activity of public officials is disclosed and the 
efficiency of the governmental agency involved is not permanently 
impaired. On its surface, the Sprague result achieved both outcomes. 
What cannot be ignored, however, is that Sprague upheld a dismissal 
in retaliation for an employee's revelation of a possible impropriety of 
great public interest. This result, of course, does not encourage such 
disclosures by high-level employees, who find themselves in a di-
lemma. On the one hand, they have a duty of loyalty that might be 
breached by public criticism of their superiors. On the other hand, 
in general their positions afford them the best opportunity to discover 
irregularities, and, to the ex-tent that they are imbued with a public-
service ethic and view their positions as involving a public trust, 
they will desire to disclose the improprieties they discover.108 
At least two alternatives exist that may somewhat ameliorate the 
dilemma faced by high-level employees who wish to "blow the 
106. 546 F.2d at 565. The court stressed that Sprague, who was Fitzpatrick's 
direct administrative and policymaking subordinate, had stated publicly "that his im-
mediate superior had not told the truth." 546 F.2d at 565. 
107. 546 F.2d at 566. Chief Judge Seitz concurred because of the particular facts 
involved and stated that he did not read the majority opinion to hold that "the dis-
ruptive factor tips the scales in all such cases." 546 F.2d at 566 (Seitz, C.J., concur-
ring). 
108. The undesirability of the Sprague result should now be manifest. First, the 
decision deters public employee disclosure of governmental improprieties. Second, 
the employees who are least deterred-and consequently most likely to be discharged 
for disclosure-are persons whose public-service ethic makes them highly qualified 
to hold positions of public trust. Third, disclosures of significant governmental 
wrongdoing, which are clearly in the public interest, also will most certainly lead to 
the disclosing employee's dismissal, since the governmental efficiency will quite likely 
suffer at least short-term disruption because of the disclosure. Thus, given the result 
in Sprague, only those employees who have the extraordinary personal integrity and 
courage to sacrifice their employment in order to serve the public interest are likely 
to disclose governmental improprieties. And, because those personal characteristics 
that lead these employees to risk dismissal are precisely those desired in public em-
ployees, the result in Sprague is clearly perverse. 
As the remainder of this subsection of the Note indicates, there are no simple 
solutions to the problems arising in Sprague. By failing to address these difficult 
issues, however, the Sprague court reached a result clearly contrary to the public in-
terest. Although that court might not have been able to resolve all the issues satis-
factorily had it attempted to face them, a thoughtful consideration of them would 
surely have produced an opinion less antithetical to the public interest. 
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whistle."100 One, the judicial adoption of a two-stage balancing test, 
pertains to the proper constitutional analysis and remedy for cases 
involving a discharge in retaliation for a disclosure that results in dis-
ruption of the employment relationship. The other, the unauthor-
ized news leak by the disclosing employee, seeks to avoid -the dis-
charge altogether. 
The initative for the first alternative lies with the courts, which 
could provide the disclosing employee with damages for dismissal 
while refusing to reinstate him because his utterance destroyed his 
working relationship with superiors. 110 Of course, damages could 
not be awarded unless the speech was held to be constitutionally pro-
tected, a determination •that requires application of the Pickering 
balancing test. A distinction that the Court in Pickering had no rea-
son to consider-the distinction between the disruption or impairment 
of governmental operations actually caused by the employee's speech 
and ,that caused by his continued presence following the criticism-
might avoid the result in Sprague. In determining whether the speech 
is protected, a court would balance only the first element of disruption 
against the employee's free speech interest. If this balancing favors 
the employee's speech, the court would again apply a balancing ap-
proach to determine whether reinstatement-as opposed to merely 
109. A third alternative might be to discipline the employee only if he makes the 
disclosure in "knowing and reckless disregard of the likelihood that disclosure will 
result in serious harm" to the governmental interest. See Comment, 64 CALIF. L. 
REv. 108, supra note 101, at 141-42. This standard would not conform to the Picker-
ing test, since disruption of governmental operations sufficient to outweigh an em-
ployee's free speech interests could occur whether or not the employee had actual 
knowledge of the likelihood of harm. Moreover, acting with "knowing and reckless 
disregard" for the consequences of the disclosure might be evidence that the employee 
lacked the qualifications required for continued public employment. See generally 
text at notes 70-73 supra. 
110. Some courts have steadfastly maintained that a claim for reinstatement must 
be accepted if the employee had been discharged in violation of his constitutional 
rights, even if reinstatement may promote personal antagonisms. See, e.g., Sterzing 
v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974). Such cases 
should not be read for the proposition that the only remedy available is reinstatement. 
First, if the plaintiff seeks only damages, as did Sprague, the Constitution hardly 
compels the court to require reinstatement. Cf. Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 
434 F. Supp. 1273, 1308-09 (D. Del. 1977) (back pay awarded where reinstatement 
was inappropriate since academic year in which untenured teacher had contract right 
to teach had ended). But cf. Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 412 F. Supp. at 918 (trial court 
asserted that, by seeking only monetary relief, Sprague admitted that he had de-
stroyed his working relationship with Fitzpatrick, thereby acknowledging that his 
speech was not protected under Pickering). 
The real issue involved in the two-stage balancing test proposed in the text is 
whether a court can award only monetary damages to a plaintiff seeking reinstate-
ment where it finds that the plaintiff's rights have been violated but that reinstate-
ment is inappropriate. Courts have imposed this limited remedy in employment dis-
crimination cases. See EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and cases cited therein at 420 F. Supp. at 926 n.18. 
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damages-is the appropriate remedy. Rather ,than reaching consti-
tutional dimensions, ,this second balancing would simply weigh the 
employee's interest in reinstatement against the government's inter-
est in preventing the inefficiency and disruption that reinstatement 
might produce.111 
Applying this two-stage balancing ,test to the facts in Sprague, 
a court might well have concluded that the dismissal violated 
Sprague's constitutional rights because the public's interest in 
Sprague's revelation outweighed the immediate disruption caused by 
the speech. This result at the constitutional proteotion stage does 
not require reinstatement, since at the remedy stage the disruption 
caused by reinstating Sprague might well have outweighed Sprague's 
interest in reclaiming the position. Under these circumstances, a 
court could justifiably limit Sprague's remedy to recovery of mone-
tary damages.112 
Judicial acceptance of a two-stage balancing test in cases involv-
ing disruption of superior-subordinate relationships would increase 
the likelihood that public employees will more freely disclose gov-
111. Some presumption should be made in favor of reinstatement and against 
merely monetary compensation, if only because of the likelihood that the latter wlll 
inadequately encourage disclosure in the public interest. For a discussion of the 
factors that might weigh on both sides of the remedy balance, see note 112 infra. 
In using the two-stage test, courts ought to look beyond any particular case and 
consider whether giving additional weight-at the constitutional balancing stage or 
at the remedy stage, or both-to the employee's disclosure of governmental impro-
prieties might encourage future disclosures. 
112. The result in Sprague probably occurred because the court gave too much 
weight to the government's interest in preventing or avoiding future disruption of a 
working relationship that required mutual trust and confidence. This overemphasis 
on future disruption likely occurred because the court failed to separate the constitu-
tional considerations from the remedy considerations. Whenever the disruption of 
future working relationships is significant, as in Sprague, the employee's speech would 
not be protected under the court's approach. 
The two-stage test suggested in the text avoids giving undue significance to the 
continued disrup9on of the "whistle blower's" working relationship with his superiors 
by considering 1he continued disruption only at the remedy stage. To facilitate the 
initial constitutional balancing, a court might treat the disclosure as though it were 
made by an employee who was not in an immediately subordinate relationship to the 
target of the disclosure-i.e., an employee who did not have a duty of loyalty. 
Figure 1 illustrates the differing results that can be reached under the Sprague 
court's apparent approach and under the two-stage balancing test. In this hypotheti-
cal employee disclosure case, the factors weighing in favor of the government have 
a value of S0x for the temporary disruption caused by the disclosure-a value unaf-
fected by whether the disclosing employee continues his employment-and 200x for 
the continued disrpption resulting if the employee is not discharged or has been dis-
charged but is reinstated. On the employee's side are a weight of lS0x, which repre• 
sents the interests in his expression-a value composed of the employee's interest in 
making the disclosure, the public's interest in learning of the particular impropriety, 
and the public's interest in encouraging such disclosures-and SOx for the employee's 
interest in reinstatement. 
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ernmental improprieties.113 Although application of this test does 
not prevent the removal of "whistle blowers" where the future 
governmental efficiency is sufficiently threatened, the availability of 
compensation for dismissal in appropriate cases might encourage rev-
elations by otherwise reluctant public employees. 
The alternative method by which the Sprague result can be 
avoided-the unauthorized news leak-could be employed by high-
level public employees who wish to disclose improper governmental 
conduct while avoiding any disruption of their working relationship 
with superiors.1u Employees who make such disclosures and remain 
FIGURE 1 
RELATIVE WEIGHTS IN DISCLOSURE HYPOlliETICAL 
Employee's Expression Governmental Disruption 
150x :interest in expression 50x :temporary disruption inde-
-employee's interest pendent of reinstatement 
-public's interest in this or continued employment 
disclosure 
-public's interest in en-
couraging disclosures 
50x :interest in reinstatement 












balancing stage 150x for employee 
Remedy balancing 
stage 50x for employee 
200x :continued disruption if not 




50x for government 
200x for government 
As Figure 1 indicates, under the Sprague approach the resultant balancing favors 
the government and would uphold dismissal of the employee. On the other hand, 
the two-stage test results in the constitutional protection of the employee's disclosure, 
while the governmental interest in avoiding continued disruption dictates denying re-
instatement. 
113. The two-stage balancing test should not be used ·to preclude dismissal of em-
ployees whose speech demonstrates incompetency or manifests an incompatible work 
philosophy, even though it might be argued that often only the future consequences 
of such speech outweigh the individual's interest in the expression. The application 
of remedy-based balancing should be limited to cases, such as those involving a duty 
of loyalty, where the government's interest is only in the disruption caused by the 
effect of the employee's speech on others with whom the employee must work, rather 
than in those characteristics of the employee that are demonstrated by the content 
of his speech. This reasoning suggests that the remedy-based test should also apply 
to cases involving disruption of harmony among co-workers. See generally text at 
notes 120-24 infra. 
114. "Deep Throat,'' possibly the most famous of all informants on illicit acts 
of governmental officials, was apparently able to avoid disruption of his or her work-
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unidentified would be serving the public interest while retaining 
their employment. 115 If the identity of the informant becomes 
known and results in his dismissal, the court should treat the unau-
thorized news leak as they would an overt disclosure-by utilizing 
the two-stage balancing test to determine whether the expression 
was protected and, if so, whether reinstatement is an appropriate 
remedy. 
The lower courts have tended to view the role of the public em-
ployee more as that of a mild-mannered worker who follows orders 
than as that of a guardian of the public interest who should be en-
couraged to disclose governmental improprieties. Although the 
public interest in efficient government might often require this ap-
proach, Pickering stands for the proposition that the countervailing 
interests in free speech must be considered. Consistent with Picker-
ing, the lower courts should recognize that the societal benefits re-
sulting from public employee participation in the public discussion 
of governmental affairs and in the exposure of illicit governmental 
activity require that these workers be protected from discipline un-
less their expression significantly impairs the efficiency of govern-
mental operations. And, even in that circumstance, the public im-
portance of the employee's speech might justify at least a recovery 
of monetary damages for his discharge. 
A relatively complex relationship between the nature of an em-
ployee's position, on the one hand, and the concepts of insubordina-
tion, duty of loyalty, and disclosure of governmental improprieties, 
on the other, emerges from the implications of Pickering and the 
cases discussed above. First, workers who criticize superiors with 
whom they have no intimate working relationship generally should 
not be disciplined, for that criticism will seldom result in actual im-
pairment of governmental efficiency.116 Second, from the stand-
point of his freedom of expression, the status of an employee's posi-
tion is a double-edged sword, cutting more one way or ,the other de-
pending on the particular facts of each case. The courts have imposed 
a strong duty of loyalty on those employees who hold high, sensitive 
ing relationship with superiors by escaping detection. According to Bernstein and 
Woodward, this informant held an "extremely sensitive" position in the Executive 
Branch and "had access to information from the White House, Justice [Department], 
the FBI and CRP [Committee To Reelect the President]." C. BERNSTEIN & B, 
WOODWARD, ALL TIIE PREsIDENT'S MEN 72, 131 (1974). 
For a general discussion of the freedom of expression as it applies to employees 
who leak information, see Comment, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 108, supra note 101, at 134-
45; Comment, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 530, supra note 99, at 531-41. 
115. The discussion in the text concerns news leaks of actual governmental im-
properties. Presumably some employees will desire to leak information concerning 
actual or fictitious misdeeds not to serve the public interest but rather solely for per-
sonal reasons, such as to embarrass a disliked supervisor. See Comment, 42 U. CHI, 
L RE.v. 530, supra note 99, at 530. 
116. See text at notes 88-89 supra, 
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positions,117 while the expression of lower-level employees is rela-
tively unfettered by any such duty.118 The freedom of expression 
enjoyed by relatively elite employees is further restricted because 
in most cases their speech is much more likely to disrupt severely 
the efficiency of the government than is the expression of lower-level 
employees. However, the position of a high-level employee also can 
cut in favor of increasing the protection accorded his expression. As 
recognized in Pickering, 119 statements of public employees with in-
formed and definite opinions are of special value to public debate, 
and employees in high-level positions are particularly likely to be re-
liably informed on those matters of public interest that come within 
the ambit of their employment. 
3. Harmony Among Co-Workers 
Pickering suggested that a disruption of the harmony among co-
workers caused by a public employee's expression might justify his 
discharge.120 This factor weighing in favor of the state might have 
either of two possible dimensions. First, an employee's expression 
might consist of repeated criticism of and disagreement with co-
workers that evidences an inability to work with others. In that 
circumstance, the disruption might best be treated as demonstrating 
the absence of a requisite employment qualification.121 Second, dis-
harmony among co-workers may result from their reaction to the 
content of an employee's expression. This latter dimension more 
clearly requires a Pickering balancing. Since most cases involving 
this dimension have also been concerned with impairment of other 
aspects of governmental efficiency, it is difficult to define clearly the 
independent weight this factor carries in the Pickering balance. Al-
though some courts have appeared to accord substantial weight to 
any disruption of harmony among co-workers, 122 the better rule from 
117. See note 92 supra; text at notes 93-107 supra. Presumably the government 
would have a more difficult time justifying the dismissal of a lower-level employee 
who made a disclosure comparable to that made in Sprague, because no intimate 
superior-subordinate relationship would have been destroyed as a result of the ex-
pression. In this circumstance, the government would be required to justify a result-
ant discharge by showing that the disclosure caused general disruption in govern-
mental efficiency. Countering this governmental interest, the lower-level employee, 
just as a higher-level official, should be able to utilize the public importance of his 
revelations as a factor weighing in his favor in the Pickering balance. 
118. In addition, the proper role of some high-level employees may be viewed as 
involving policy administration, which requires that the employ~ maintain a har-
monious relationship with his policymaking superiors. This approach seems to have 
been adopted in Muir v. County Council, 393 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1975), discussed 
in text at notes 93-95 supra. 
119. See text at note 18 supra. 
120. See text at note 14 supra. 
121. See text at notes 70-72 supra. 
122, See, e.g., Bean v. Darr, 354 F. Supp. 1157, 1161-62 (M.D.N.C. 1973), 
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the few cases that focus upon this variable is that statements by a 
public employee that result in mere grumbling among co-workers 
should not justify any retaliatory sanction. 
Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Cen-
ter123 provides an example of a decision in which the court did not 
allow a mere showing that an employee's speech disturbed co-workers 
to substitute for proof of actual impairment of governmental opera-
tions. In Rafferty, the plaintiff, a nurse, was discharged from her 
position for her criticism, quoted in a newspaper article, of patient 
care at a state hospital where she had previously been employed. 
The court invalidated the dismissal, determining inter alia that "staff 
anxiety" over the newspaper ar-ticle was not an acceptable reason for 
the disciplinary action. In so doing, the court found that the de-
fendant public employer had made no showing that this staff reaction 
would adversely affect patient care or would destroy staff morale and 
discipline, and it had failed to prove that whatever temporary furor 
had been created could not have been easily quelled by discussions 
and meetings. The court concluded that any anxiety among co-workers 
was caused by their proximity to a person who had engaged and 
might further participate in "precisely the sort ·of free and vigorous 
expression the First Amendment was designed to protect."124 
4. Speech Involving Public Employee Unions 
The increasing unionization of public employees1211 and the re-
sultant public sector labor-management interaction have added an 
additional dimension to the Pickering balancing process. The union 
character of employee speech can cut either way in determining 
the constitutional protection accorded the expression. That the 
speech often has public importance and that the speaker usually has 
more than merely a personal interest in delivering it both weigh in 
favor of broad constitutional protection. On the other hand, speech 
involving public employee unions, particularly if delivered by union 
leaders, may have great disruptive impact upon both management-
employee relations and the harmony between union and nonunion 
employees.126 Although the decision in any individual case depends 
123. 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
124. 356 F. Supp. at 508. See Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 920-24 
(D. Ariz. 1972), revd. on other grounds, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975} (social critic-
ism that upset fellow faculty members cannot justify dismissal). 
125. Although only about one out of every four employees in the private sector 
is a union member, better than 50% of public employees belong to a union. See 
Clark, Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations for an 
Emerging Problem, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 680,680 (1975). 
126. The disruptive impact of at least some kinds of employee speech delivered 
in a union context might be considered to be merely a component of whatever dis-
ruptive impact unionization in the public sector has on governmental effectiveness. 
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in large part upon its facts, the outcome also depends upon which 
of the relevant characteristics of union-related speech a court chooses 
to emphasize. 
The difference in result dictated by this difference in emphasis 
is exemplified by the majority and dissenting opinions in Fisher v. 
W alker.127 In that case, the president of a firemen's union wrote · 
a letter, which was published in a union newspaper, critical of certain 
members of an association of fire department officers. He was sus-
pended for five days without pay in retaliation for publishing the let-
ter. The Tenth Circuit upheld the suspension, agreeing with the 
trial court that the letter dealt with a departmental matter rather than 
a public issue128 and contained false criticism that had a disruptive 
impact on the morale and working relationships within the depart-
ment.129 Judge Doyle, in dissent, maintained that the defendant, 
the trial court, and the majority of the court of appeals panel all had 
given insufficient weight to the plaintiff's freedom of expression right 
to advance the union interest that he represented.180 Judge Doyle 
viewed as insulating factors the union-management context of the 
speech and the private audience to whom the expression was 
made.131 Arguing that the dissemination of information concerning 
a labor dispute is protected by the first amendment, 182 that the actual 
disruption of the working relationships in the fire department that 
the letter had caused was insufficient to outweigh the interests favor-
ing protection of the speech, 183 and that speech may not be sup-
pressed merely because it is intemperate,134 Judge Doyle maintained 
Perhaps the likelihood that such speech will have an adverse impact should be con; 
sidered in the initial decision whether to allow union bargaining rather than as a 
factor weighing against free speech in individual disciplinary matters. 
127. 464 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1972). 
128. But cf. note 99 supra (distinctions between protection accorded speech based 
upon its private or public context and its private or public content). 
129. The court concluded that these facts, together with the refusal of the plain-
tiff to try to remedy the situation, justified the suspension. 464 F.2d at 1153-54. 
Cf. Parker v. Graves, 340 F. Supp. 586, 590 (N.D. Fla. 1972), affd., 419 F.2d 335 
(5th Cir. 1973) (state university athletic department may discharge employee whose 
actions in helping form an association of athletes bent on reforming departmental 
policies created disciplinary problems). 
130. 464 F.2d at 1155 (Doyle J., dissenting). See Castleberry v. Langford, 428 
F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Tex. 1977). But cf. Magri v. Giarrusso, 379 F. Supp. 353, 361 
(E.D. La. 1974) (although police union president may have greater latitude to criti-
cize a superior than does the average police officer, he may not make statements that 
destroy the working relationships between the superior and his subordinates). 
131. 464 F.2d at 1155. For a discussion of how the Pickering balancing test is 
affected by whether expression is made in a private context, see note 99 supra. 
132. 464 F.2d at 1157. Judge Doyle relied upon Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 102 (1940), to support this proposition. 
133. 464 F.2d at 1155, 1159. 
134. 464 F.2d at 1160. 
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that the imposition of ate sanction was not justifiable under the first 
amendment.135 
The public importance of union-related speech was also recog-
nized in Holodnak v. Avco Corp.,136 although the result in that case 
is also supportable without reliance on the special value of such ex-
pression.137 In Holodnak, the defendant government defense con-
tractor discharged an employee for publishing in a union newsletter an 
article that was critical of labor-management relations at the defen-
dant's pJant. At trial Judge Lumbard, in holding that the employee 
had been discharged under color of state law138 in violation of his 
right of free speech, stated that, because the employee's speech dealt 
with the "rough-and-tumble of labor relations," it deserved more 
tolerance than it would if expressed in other contexts, such as in "the 
refined atmosphere of a classroom."189 After applying the Pickering 
balancing test, Judge Lumbard concluded that the "use of vitupera-
tives alone" was protected where such expression did not interfere 
with production at the defendant's plant.140 
Police unionism presents a potential conflict between the emer-
ging judicial recognition of the importance of the role of public em-
ployee union leaders and the traditional judicial conception of the 
nature of police work. Historically courts have justified severe re-
striction of the police officer's freedom of expression by viewing the 
police department as a paramilitary organization dependent upon 
rigid discipline. 141 Although some recent decisions have adhered 
to this view, 142 others have considered 1:he characteristics of public 
135. 464 F.2d at 1159-60. 
136. 381 F. ~pp. 191 (D. Conn. 11,974), affd. in part, revd. in part, 514 F.2d 
285 (2d Cir.) (reversing only award of punitive damages), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
892 '(1975). 
137. The court found that the plaintiffs speech did not interfere with plant pro-
duction. See text at note 140 infra. 
138. 381 F . ..Supp. at 201-02. 
139. 381 F. Supp. at 202. 
140. 381 F. Supp. at 202-03. Cf. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 
1175-77 (Wyo. 1976) (teacher's statements in union publication held protected be-
cause no showing had been made of impairment of his job performance or of disrup• 
tion of the school). 
141. See generally Note, The Policeman: Must He Be a Second-Class Citizen 
with Regard to His First Amendment Rights?, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 536, 537-39 (1971). 
142. See Norton v. City of Santa Ana, 15 Cal. App. 3d 419, 426, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
37, 41 (1971); In re Gioglio, 104 N.J. Super. 88, 96, 248 A.2d 570, 574 (1968), 
Other cases have emphasized the special nature of police employment without ex-
pressly accepting the paramilitary model. In Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), 
the Supreme Court reversed a Second Circuit decision and let stand a county regula-
tion limiting the length of policemen's hair. The court of appeals had concluded that 
the state had the burden of showing a genuine public need for the police regulation, 
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Supreme Court, disagreed: 
This view was based upon the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the "unique 
judicial deference" accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the 
military was inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justifica-
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employment unique to police officers that might justify some restric-
tion of their free speech as but one element in the Pickering bal-
ancing -test.143 The balancing process becomes even more complex 
when the characteristics of police employment combine with the 
special governmental and public interests in union-related speech. 
In Brukiewa v. Police Commissioner, 144 the court resolved the con-
flicting interests •in favor of the employee. 145 The plaintiff in 
Brukiewa made remarks critical of the police department while 
appearing on a television program in his official capacity as president 
of a police officer's union. In overturning the one-year suspended 
dismissal the plaintiff received in response to his expression, the court 
first noted that no showing had been made that the statements had 
impaired the governmental interest. It then asserted that the expres-
sion dealt with a matter of public importance with which the officer 
tion for the characterization of the police as "para-military." But the conclusion 
that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no way detracts from the de-
ference due [the county's] choice of an organizational structure for its police 
force. Here the county has chosen a mode of organization which it undoubtedly 
deems the most efficient in enabling its police to carry out the duties assigned to 
them under state and local law. Such a choice necessarily gives weight to the 
overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity. · 
425 U.S. at 246 (footnote omitted). 
Another case that gives weight to the "special" role played by police is Slocum 
v. Fire & Police Commr., 8 Ill. App. 3d 465, 290 N.E.2d 28 (1972). In that case, 
a policeman received a thirty-day suspension for refusing to wear an American flag 
emblem on his uniform. In upholding the suspension over the policeman's argument 
that the requirement unconstitutionally forced him to make symbolic speech of a 
patriotic nature, the court reached the seemingly contradictory conclusions that, al-
though a flag emblem on a uniform has only a minimal and ambiguous speech ele-
ment, the emblem does tend to develop patriotism and thus furthers an important 
governmental interest. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 290 N.E.2d at 33. Presiding Judge 
Stouder in dissent argued, inter alia, that the promotion of patriotism is not a func-
tion of special concern to police departments, as distinguished from other public 
agencies. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 475, 290 N.E.2d at 36 (Stouder, P.J., dissenting). 
143. See Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976); Bence v. 
Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1 192 (7th Cir. 1974); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 
(7th Cir. 1970). See also Haurilak v. Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 626, 631 (D. Conn. 
1977) (Lumbard, J.). Regarding the proposition that the peculiar nature of some 
types of public employment is simply one element to be considered in the Pickering 
balancing test, compare Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 1969) (dis-
missal of Peace Corps volunteer who had written letter to newspaper and signed peti-
tion condemning Vietnam War held improper under first amendment), with Murphy 
v. Facendia, 307 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo. 1969) (VISTA volunteers who had signed 
petition condemning Vietnam War may be dismissed because their action improperly 
identified VISTA with antiwar protest). 
144. 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970). 
145. The court went somewhat further than most courts in rejecting the tradi-
tional view of the necessity for special restrictions on police expression. Rather than 
merely treating the unique character of police employment as an element in the 
Pickering balancing, the court purported to grant "full" first amendment rights to 
policemen by substituting the word "policeman" for "teacher" in reading the Picker-
ing opinion. 257 Md. at 52, 263 A.2d at 218. The Brukiewa court cited the follow-
ing quotation from Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967), in support 
of its position: "We conclude that policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not re-
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had "experienced expertise,"146 presumably because of his role in 
the police union.147 
The Holodnak and Brukiewa cases exemplify the better, more 
realistic view that public employee unions serve legitimate interests 
and that, as such, their representatives should be accorded the lati-
tude necessary to represent their constituents vigorously in the 
"rough and tumble" setting of labor-management relations.148 These 
interests do not preclude disciplining employees for disruptive union-
related expression. The courts should recognize the role harsh 
rhetoric often plays in labor-management disputes, however, and 
should not allow the tone of the speech to be a substitute for the 
Pickering requirement of substantial disruption of governmental 
operations. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Given the variety of factual settings that have faced the courts 
in public employee discharge cases, any conclusions to be drawn 
legated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." 257 Md. at 51, 263 A.2d 
at 218. The Garrity case involved testimony of police officers who were coerced 
into forfeiting their privilege against self-incrimination by the threat of removal from 
public employment. 
146. 257 Md. at 52-53, 263 A.2d at 218. 
147. Another case that found that the first amendment interests in the speech of 
police union leaders outweighed any unique aspects of police department employment 
and any disruption caused within the department by the expression is Hanneman v. 
Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1976). 
148. According to'a recent decision of the Supreme Court, however, the existence 
of these unions must not be allowed to cut off the individual nonunion employee's 
right of free speech on labor matters. In City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 
8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commn., 429 U.S. 167 (1976), a nonunion 
teacher appeared before a public meeting of the Madison Board of Education and, 
over the objection of a representative of the teacher's union, read a petition signed 
by teachers in the school district regarding pending labor negotiations between the 
board and the union. Subsequently the union filed a complaint with the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission that claimed that the board, in permitting the 
nonunion teacher to speak, had violated Wisconsin law by negotiating with a member 
of a bargaining unit other than the exclusive collective bargaining representative. 
The commission concluded that the board had committed a prohibited labor practice 
and ordered the board to permit no employees other than representatives of the union 
to appear and speak on such labor matters at board meetings. The commission's 
order was upheld by a Wisconsin circuit court and the state supreme court, the latter 
holding that the abridgement of the nonunion teacher's freedom of speech was justi-
fied in order to avoid chaos in labor-management relations. City of Madison Joint 
School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commn., 69 Wis. 2d 200, 
212, 231 N.W.2d 206, 212-13 (11975). A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, holding that, whatever its duties as an employer, 
a school board may not be forced to discriminate among speakers appearing at open 
board meetings on the basis of their employment or the content of their views. 429 
U.S. at 176. The Chief Justice noted that nonunion teachers have the absolute right 
to consult among themselves and communicate their collective views to the general 
public, and therefore it would be inconsistent with first amendment concepts to hold 
that dissident teachers could not communicate their views directly to the govern-
mental body that made policy on which they had an opinion. 429 U.S. at 176 n.10. 
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from the post-Pickering cases must be somewhat tentative. Perhaps 
the greatest contributions made by post-Pickering cases to an ex-
panded protection of the freedom of expression of public employees 
are the notions (1) that discipline of a public employee may not be 
even partially motivated to punish him for his protected expression, 
unless the public employer would have discharged the employee 
even if he had not made the expression in question,149 and (2) that 
the employee's speech-so long as it is not knowingly or recklessly 
fals~may justify discipline only if it results in material and substan-
tial impairment of the governmental interest.150 Moreover, in addi-
tion to promoting freedom of expression, the establishment of these 
standards at least somewhat blunts the criticism that the predictability 
of the Pickering balancing test is low.151 
Although some courts have apparently felt constrained to limit 
their analysis to the specific elements mentioned in Pickering, others 
have adopted the spirit of the Pickering decision by incorporating 
into the balance other considerations that reflect the governmental, 
public, and private interests related to an employee's speech. This 
flexibility in applying Pickering is exemplified by those cases that 
have considered the effect of union-related speech on the balancing 
process. However, as indicated by the majority opinion in Fisher 
v. Walker,152 courts can still try to justify a decision under the balanc-
ing test that clearly gives too much weight to a single element men-
tioned in Pickering as favoring the state or that accords insufficient 
weight to factors favoring protection of the employee's expression. 
This Note has been premised on the notion that the public inter-
est in open government and the interest of public employees in their 
own speech warrant broad protection of the freedom of expression 
of these workers. Pickering and many of -the cases following it 
recognize the desirability of protecting the first amendment rights 
of public employees, although the large number of cases arising on 
this issue may indicate that ·the significance of Pickering has not yet 
adequately imbued the thinking of governmental employment super-
visors. As future cases further delineate the scope of the freedom 
of expression of public employees, the day may come when no 
worker holding a routine governmental position need feel that 
timidity is a job requirement. Possibly the most troublesoll_le ques-
tion yet to be resolved in this area involves the protection of em-
ployee disclosures of governmental improprieties, an issue in which 
149. See text at notes 42-64 supra. 
150. See text at notes 65-68 supra. 
151. See note 25 supra. 
1S2. 464 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1972), discussed in text at notes 127-3S supra. 
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the public's interest in promoting the exposure of official wrongdoing 
collides with its interest in efficient government. How courts resolve 
this conflict will largely determine the extent to which higher-ech-
elon governmental personnel are viewed as trustees of the public 
interest. 
